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I. INTRODUCTI ON: AN EXPLOSION OF FRIVOLOUS LIT!GA TION? 
The aggregate quantity of l i tigation in the United S tates ,  both 
m comparison with other countries and over time, has been and 
remains the subject  of much controversy.! But the often heard 
phrase "litigation explosion" is merely descriptive,  being devoid of 
any particular normative content. A recent, related, and more 
specific debate concerns the nature or quality of l i tigation in specific 
areas, including but not limited to, medical malpractice,  product 
liabi l i ty, and securities fraud. 2 In particular, many legal and social 
commentators feel that America is and has been experiencing an 
explosion in so-called strike lawsuits, also known as nmsance 
lawsuits or frivolous l i tigation . 
An explosion in frivolous l i tigation is not nonnatively 
neutral . A perceived rise in frivolous lawsuits alleging securities 
1 .  Legal sociologist Professor Marc Galanter argues that an explosion in 
l it igation is not only foreseeable, but also socially desirable .  Marc Galanter, The 
Day Ajier the L itigation Explosion. 46 Mo. L .  REV. 3, 38 ( 1986) .  But Walter 
Olson, a senior fel low of the Manhattan Inst i tute, argues that an explosion in 
l i tigat ion is both man-made and socially undesirable. WALTER K. OLSON, THE 
L ITIGATlON EXPLOS ION : WHAT H APPEN E D  WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE 
LAWSUIT (Penguin Group 1 991 ) ; WALTER K. OLSON, THE RUL E  OF LAWY ERS: 
HOW THE NEW L ITIGAT ION ELITE THREATENS AMERICA'S  RULE OF LA \V (2003 ) . 
2. See, e.g., REGULATION THROUGH L ITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi  ed . ,  2002) 
(providing selected examples within these areas, i nc luding cases deal ing with 
tobacco, fireanns, lead-based paint, breast implants, managed care, and insurance) .  
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fraud was a major impetus for the provisions imposing strict 
pleading requirements contained in the Private Securities L itigation 
Refonn Act of 1995, which Congress enacted over President 
Clinton ' s  veto) The politics of American litigation reform and 
specific anti-litigation campaigns are an interesting reflection of 
American culture, history, and society that is  beyond the scope of 
this Article .4 
Whether there has been such a frivolous litigation explosion 
is a descriptive and historical question that is empirically challenging 
to resolve because nearly all lawsuits settle,5 with many of the 
settlements involving confidentiality agreements . Everyone agrees 
there is a demand for more empirical research and work about civil 
procedure and litigation,6 but unfortunately the supply of  i t  is still 
rare .7 But positive theoretical economics can provide insights into 
frivolous litigation in the fmm of implications from analytical, 
formal, rigorous, and systematic models .  8 What procedural or 
3. Pub. L .  No. 1 04-67, 1 09 Stat. 737 ( 1 995 )  (codified at 1 5  U.S .C .  § 78u-
4(b)(2) (2000)). 
4 .  See general�v THOMAS F .  B U RKE, LA WYERS, LAWSUITS, A N D  LEGAL 
RIGHTS: THE B ATTLE OYER  LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCI ETY (2002) .  
5 .  See. e.g. , Jud ith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injwy: 
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 1 1 3 HARY.  L .  REV. 924, 928 nn. 1 0- 1 1 
(2000) (providing sources for stat ist ics that about 70% of the civi l  cases fi led in 
federal court settle; 24% ending i n  pretrial d ismissal, default judgment, summary 
judgment, or s imi lar dispos ition; with only 6% proceeding to trial) . 
6. See. e.g. , Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 1 45 U.  PA.  L .  REV. 
5 1 9, 597 ( 1 997) (acknowledging that empi rical research has identified several 
settings l ikely to encourage frivolous l i t igation, but "[m]ore work is needed, of 
course"). 
7 . See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the L itigation Process: 
The Paradox of Losing by Winning, in IN L IT IGATION : DO THE HAYES ST ILL COME 
OUT AHEAD? 1 68 (Herbert M .  Kritzer & Susan S i lbey eds . ,  2003) (providing an 
example of empirical research about c ivi l  procedure and l i ti gation) ;  Stephen B.  
Bur bank, Amer. Judicature Soc . ,  Rule 11 in Transition: The Report of the Third 
Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ( 1 989) (same); Kevin 
M. Clermont & Theodore E isenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL  L. REV. 
1 1 9, 1 20-21, 1 25-29 (2002) (advocating the importance of emp irical methods on 
present and future l egal issues); Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of 
Empirical Research in Civil Ru/emaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L .  REV. 1 1 2 1 ,  1 1 26-4 1 
(2002) (discussing the various types of empi rical research that commentators have 
sought for the mle-making process) ;  see general�y Michael Heise ,  The Future of 
Civil Justice Reform and Empirical Legal Scholarship.· A Reply, 5 1  CASE W. RES .  
L .  REV. 251 (2000) . 
8 .  See. e.g., A.  Mitchell Pol insky & Daniel L .  Rubinfeld, Sanctioning 
Frivolous Suits: A n  Economic A na�vsis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397 ,  426-35 ( 1993) 
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substantive reforms would reduce frivolous l itigation is a normative 
question that raises difficult concerns involving procedural faimess, 
both outcome-based and process-based, in addition to questions 
regarding the nature and l imits of substantive rights. But normative 
theoretical economics can help answer this question by identifying 
and comparing the various error and process costs of  a1ternative 
9 reforms. 
This A1iicle develops a new themy of poss ibly frivolous 
litigation by focusing on a p laintiffs  options to unilaterally abandon 
a lawsuit .lO Federal Rule of Civi l  Procedure 4l(a)(l)(i) and its 
various state lavv counterparts petmit, under certain circumstances, a 
plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss her lawsuit without prejudice .l l 
A. The Value of L itigation Abandonment Options: A 
Hypothetical Example 
The following hypothetical example il lustrates the value of  a 
p laintiffs  option to abandon or drop litigation. Suppose that Portia 
sues Daphne. In addition, suppose that Portia' s  ex ante or initial 
expected probability of prevailing at trial is 1 12 .  Suppose also that, 
initially, the monetary judgment that Portia expects to win at trial is 
$ 1 ,000,000. Under these facts, Portia' s actual initial expected 
judgment at trial is ( 1 12 )($ 1 ,000,000),  or $500,000.  Suppose that 
Portia's total expected litigation cost of proceeding to a trial i s  
$550,000.  Portia ' s  lawsuit will have a net expected value of 
$500,000- $550,000 = -$50,000 < 0.  
Now divide the lawsuit into two stages, discovery and trial, 
each of which costs Portia $275,000. In addition, suppose that 
(providing a formal economic model of how optimally to sanction frivolous 
lawsuits) .  
9 .  See, e.g. , ROBERT G. BONE, CIV I L  P ROCEDURE:  THE ECONOMICS OF C IVIL  
P ROCEDURE 1 25-57 (2003) (analyzing error and process costs in determining how 
to conduct a nonnative study of procedural rules) . 
I 0 .  This novel theory was originally developed and introduced in Peter H .  
Huang, Li tigation Options in Civi l  P rocedure ( 1 997)  (unpubl ished J . D .  thesis, 
Stanford University) (on file with author) and reproduced in JOS EPH A.  
GRUNDFEST & PETER H .  HUANG, REAL OPTIONS AND T H E  ECONOMIC  ANALYS IS OF 
L IT IGAT ION: A PREL IM INARY INQU IRY (Stanford Law School Olin Program in Law 
and Econ. ,  Work ing Paper No. 131, 1 996) .  
1 1 . FED.  R. Civ . P.  4l(a) ( l ) ( i) ;  see also M ichael E .  Sol imine & Amy E .  
L ippert, Deregulating Voluntary Dismissals, 3 6  U. MICH .  J .L .  REFORM 367, 376-
78, 406- 18 (2003) (summarizing the state law and District of Columbia 
counterparts to Rule 41 (a)(  1 ) ( i )  and reproducing the relevant portions of those 
provisions). 
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discovery resolves all of the risks o f  Portia ' s  litigation, so the 
posterior or ex post probabil ity conditional upon discovery of Portia's 
prevailing in court is either 0 or 1 .  Pmiia would only proceed when 
she has a sure winner, and Portia would abandon a sure loser. Under 
those facts, the revised initial expected value or initial option value 
that the lawsuit has for Pm1ia would be ( 1 12)($ 1 ,000,000 - $275,000) 
- $275,000 = ( 1 12)($725,000) - $275,000 = $362,500 - 275,000 = 
$87,500 > 0 .  Notice that, holding fixed the other values of the 
parameters in this example, this lawsuit has initial positive option 
value as long as the monetary judgment from Portia ' s  prevai ling in 
court exceeds $825,000.  Portia would initially file this Negative 
Expected Value ("NEV") lawsuit ;  however, after discovery, Portia 
would choose to drop this lawsuit if Portia and Daphne believe that 
Portia wil l  lose at trial . 
In order to il lustrate in the simplest possible way the 
settlement value of this litigation, suppose that Daphne' s litigation 
costs are the same as Portia ' s  costs; that is, that Daphne ' s  total 
expected litigation costs for proceeding to a trial are $550,000, with 
each of discovery and trial  expected to cost Daphne $275,000. 
Finally, suppose that Daphne and Portia have equal bargaining 
strength . Then, after discovery, Daphne and Portia either l earn that 
Portia has a sure loser-in which case, Portia abandons the 
l i tigation-or Daphne and Portia learn that Portia has a sure winner. 
If Portia has a sure winner, then Portia should accept any sett lement 
amount that exceeds what she expects to get by proceeding to trial­
namely, $ 1 ,000,000 - $275,000.  In addition, Daphne should offer 
any settlement amount that is less than what she expects to lose by 
proceeding to trial-namely, $ 1 ,000,000 + $2 7 5, 000 .  Because 
Daphne and Portia have equal bargaining power, they agree to settle 
for $ 1 ,000,000, which is the midpoint of the range between 
$ 1 ,000,000 - $275,000 and $ 1 ,000 ,000 + $275,000. 
Now that we have figured out what Daphne and Portia would 
sett le for after discovery but before trial if both learn that Portia has a 
winner, we can proceed to determine what happens before discovery. 
Upon Portia ' s  commencing the l itigation, both Daphne and Portia 
can reason, as we have above, that if they proceed and incur the costs 
of discovery-namely, $275,000 each-then, with an initial 
probabi l ity of 1 /2 ,  Portia wil l  have a credible threat to proceed to 
trial . As a result, Daphne and Portia would settle for $1,000,000 
after discovery. Thus, Portia should accept any settlement amount 
that exceeds what she initially expects to get by proceeding to 
discovery--namely, ( 1 12)($ 1 ,000,000) - $275,000. In addition, 
Daphne should offer any settlement amount that is less than what she 
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initially expects to lose by proceeding to discovery-namely, 
( 1 12)($ 1 ,000,000) + $275,000.  As before, because Daphne and 
Portia have equal bargaining power, they will settle for 
( 1 12)($ 1 ,000,000) ,  or $500,000,  which is the midpoint of  the range 
between $500,000 - $27 5,000 and $500,000 + $275,000.  Recall that 
when the plaintiff must pay for all her l i tigation costs up front-that 
is, when the p laintiff does not have the option to abandon the 
litigation after discovery-this is a NEV lawsuit . In other words, the 
plaintiffs  threat for pursuing litigation is not credible, and the 
settlement value is zero . 
B. Lawsuit Abandonment Options zn Game-Theoretic 
Lit igation Models 
Appendix B of this Article presents a multi-period algebraic 
options game-theoretic model of l itigation that generalizes the 
hypothetical numerical example above by incorporating general 
bargaining strengths, l itigation costs, and probabi lity beliefs on the 
part of the plaintiff and the defendant. Interested readers should look 
over the appendices of this Article before going forward. Appendix 
A provides an accessible, nontechnical, self-contained, and user­
friendly primer about options for those unfamiliar with options. 
Appendix B contains a fmmal, mathematical game-theoretic analysis 
of a p laintiff s  options to unilaterally abandon a lawsuit .  The rest of 
this Article is organized as follows . Part II  of this Article p laces this 
Articl e ' s  options approach to l itigation, including quite possibly, 
frivolous l itigation in the context of the l iterature of economic 
models about l i tigation in general and frivolous litigation in 
particular. This part of the Article explains that possib ly frivolous 
lawsuits wil l  be filed and settled when the values of a p laintiff s  
options to unilaterally abandon l itigation exceed the costs of 
purchasing those l itigation-abandonment options by continuing the 
litigation. Part III of this Article addresses some of the limitations of 
this Article ' s  abandonment options game-theoretic model of 
l itigation.12 In particular, there is reason to believe that p eople have 
cognitive limitations in their abilities to reason backwards in 
sequential interactions.l3 Empirical and experimental evidence also 
1 2 .  See also ALEXANDER VOLLERT, A STOCHASTIC CONTROL F RAMEWORK 
FOR REAL OPTIONS !N  STRATEG!C VALUATION 7 ,  42-44 (2002) (discussing 
drawbacks to real-options analysis in general) . 
1 3. See, e.g. , Robert Rosenthal ,  Games of Perfect Information, Predato1y 
Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 92 , 94-97 ( 198 1)  
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exists that indicates that emotions affect how peop le make 
decisions .l4 Finally, recent psychological experiments indicate that 
decision makers often overvalue options and over-invest in keeping 
options alive, even if those options present little intrinsic value. I S  
Part I V  o f  this A1iicle briefly explains how and why many laws and 
judicial doctrines effectively preclude specific legal options .  
I I .  AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION 
The application of microeconomics to litigation has a 
distingui shed and relatively long history in the field of  law and 
economics .l6 A rich, related literature analyzing civil procedure that 
utilizes microeconomics also exists .l7 Some legal practitioners 
utilize the powerful tools of single-person decision theory and risk 
analysis to help facili tate the settlement of their c lients' legal 
disputes . l 8 But multiperson decision-making theory or game theory 
(stating possible explanations for non-rat ional decisions in perfect-infonnation 
games) . 
1 4 . See, e.g. , Wilco W.  Van D ijk et a!., Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes 
of D ecisions: The Role of Counteifactual Thought in the Experience of R egret and 
Disappointment, 75 0 RG .  BEHAV.  & HUM.  D EC ISION P ROCESSES 1 1 7 ,  1 36-38 
( 1 998) (showing evidence of how counterfactual  thoughts about unfavorable­
deci sion outcomes give rise to qual itatively different emotions, and how 
antic ipation of these emotions results in altered decision-making) .  
15 . J iwoong Shin & D an Ariely, Keep ing Doors Open:  The Effect of 
Unavailability on Incentives to Keep Options Viable, presented at the Society for 
the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (July 3 1 ,  2003)  (unpublished 
manuscript, on file  with author) . 
1 6 . For excellent surveys of this  l i terature, see Robert D .  Cooter & Dan i e l L. 
Rubinfeld, Economic Ana�vsis ofL egal D isputes and Their Resolution, 27  J. ECON . 
L ITERATURE I 067 ( 1 989) ; ROBERT D .  COOTER & THOMAS S .  ULEN,  LAW AN D 
ECONOMICS  4 78-99 ( I  st ed. 1 988) ;  Bruce L .  Hay & Kathryn E .  Sp ier, Settlement of 
Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRA VE  D ICTIONARY OF ECONOM ICS  AND THE  LAW 
442 (Peter Newman ed., 1 998 ) .  
1 7 . See, e.g, Geoffrey P .  M iller, Introduction: Economic Analysis of Civil 
Procedure, 23  J. LEGAL STUD. 303 ,  3 03 -06 ( 1 994) (providing a representative 
selection of research on the impact oflaw and economics on c iv i l  procedure) .  
1 8 . See, e.g. , David P.  Hoffer, Decision A na�vsis as a Mediator's Tool, I 
HARV. NEGOT. L .  REV .  1 1 3, 1 1 3 - 1 9  ( 1 996) (stating how decision analysis is used); 
Marj orie C. Aaron, The Value of Decision A na�ysis in Mediation Practice, I I  
NEGOT. J .  1 23 ,  1 23-33 ( 1 995) (discussing the value of decision analysis in 
mediation practice);  Marc B. Victor, The Proper Use of Decis ion A nalysis to Assist 
L itigation Strategy, 40 Bus.  LAW. 6 1 7 , 6 1 7-29 ( 1 985) (discussing decision 
analysis and address ing common misconceptions regarding decision analysis ) .  
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describes a lawsuit  more accurately than single-person decision­
making theory does because of the interactive and strategic nature of 
l itigation. Legal scholars have appl ied multiperson decis ion theory 
or game theory to analyze settlement negotiations in l i t igation. 1 9  
Game theory' s  origins date back at least 2500 years and can be  found 
in classic Chinese philosophical texts .20 Multiperson decis ion 
theory, as game theory is more accurately and perhaps less 
frivolously described, is a branch of applied mathematics;2 1  having 
numerous appl ications in biology,22  economics,23 management,24 
and politics.25 It has become standard practice to apply game theory 
1 9 . See, e.g. , ROBERT H .  MNOOKIN  ET AL. ,  B EYOND WINNING:  N EGOTIATING 
TO CREATE VALUE IN D EALS AND D ISPUTES 1 06-26 (2000) (discussing the 
dynamics involved in dispute resolution) .  
20. See, e.g. , SUN Tzu, THE A RT OF WAR (Oxford Universi ty P ress 1 97 1 )  
(recognizing different theories on waging war) . 
21. See, e.g. , HAROLD W. KUHN,  L ECTURES ON THE THEORY OF GAMES 
(2003) (providing mathematical formulations of  game theory) .  
22. See, e.g. , JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE T HEORY OF 
GAMES ( 1 982) (applying game theory to the study of evolution) .  
23. See, e.g., A V I  NASH DIXIT  & S USAN SKEATH,  GAMES OF STRATEGY ( 1 999) 
(providing a textbook for undergraduate game-theory courses for economics 
majors) ; DAVID M. KREPS, GAME T HEORY AND ECONOM IC MODELL I NG ( 1 987) 
(presenting a nontechnical introdu ction to  the strengths and weaknesses of 
noncooperative (asymmetric information )  game the01y) ;  ROGER A .  MCCAIN,  
GAME THEORY: A NON-TECHNI CAL  INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYS I S  OF 
STRATEGY (2004) (providing another textbook for undergraduate game-theory 
courses for economics majors) ; MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAM E  
THEORY (2004) (providing a textbook for game-theory courses for economics 
graduate students) ; F E RNANDO VEGA-REDONDO, ECONOMICS  AND TH E THEORY OF 
GAMES (2003) (same). But see Robert J. Aumann , What is Game The01y T1ying to 
Accomplish?, in FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS 28 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Seppo 
Honkapohja eds . ,  1 987) (questioning whether the goal of game theory i s  or should 
be prediction); ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, ECONOM ICS AND LANGUAGE 7 1 -88  (2000) 
(doubting the practical applicability of game theory) . 
24. See, e.g. , DAVID M .  KREPS, MICROECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 492-589 
(2004) (providing an exposition suitable for MBA students and executive 
education programs of noncooperative game theory, reciprocity and col lusion ,  and 
credibil i ty and reputation) ;  JAMES D .  M I LLER, GAME THEORY AT WORK: How TO 
USE  GAME THEORY TO OUTTH INK AND OUTMANEUVER YOUR COMPET ITION 
(2003) (presenting case studies of how businesspeople can uti l ize game theory). 
25 .  See, e.g., SCOTT GATES & B RIAN D.  H UMES,  GAMES,  INFORMATION,  AND 
POLITICS: APPLYING GAME THEORETIC MODELS TO POLITICAL SC IENCE ( 1 997) 
(presenting applications  of game-theoretic  models to American po l itics, 
comparative politics, and international relations). 
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to analyze legal mles and institutions . 2 6  Proof o f  the acceptance of 
game-theoretic reasoning in the legal scholar ' s  toolkit is found in the 
five peer-refereed journals about law and economics .27  F inally, 
game theory played a crucial role in designing the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) auctions for assigning licenses 
to wavelengths for personal communication services, such as cell 
phones and wireless computer-access services . Professor John 
McMillan provides an excellent account of this case study, which 
demonstrates the success of modem game theory, as applied to 
designing optimal regulatory policy.28  Professor McMillan explains 
that the features of the auction format the FCC adopted essentially 
were those proposed by Professors Preston McAfee, Paul R .  
Milgram, and Robert Wilson and experimentally tested by Professor 
Charles Plott. 29 As Professor McMillan stated, "When the theorists 
met the policy-makers, concepts like Bayes-Nash equilibrium, 
incentive-compatibil ity constraints, and order-statistic theorems 
came to be discussed in the corridors of power. "3 0  
2 6 .  Peter H .  Huang, Strategic Behavior and the Law: A Guide for Legal 
Scholars to Game Theory and the Law and Other Game Theory Texts, 36  
JURIMETR!CS J .  99, 99  ( 1 995)  (book review).  
27 .  All five j ournals have publ ished numerous art icles uti l iz ing  game theory. 
See. e.g , Robert Cooter & Josef Drexel, The Logic of Power in the Emerging 
European Constitution:  Game Theory and the Division of Pmver, 1 4  INT'L REV. L. 
& ECON . 307 ( 1 994) ; Peter H .  Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More 
Lavv: A Theory of  Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 1 0  J.L .  ECON. & 
ORG. 390 (1994) ;  Peter H .  Huang, International Environmental Law and 
Emotional Rational Choice, 3 1  J. L EGAL STUD. 237 (2002); Peter H .  Huang & Ho­
Mou Wu, Emotional Responses In L itigation, 1 2  INT'L REV. L .  & EcON. 3 1  ( 1992) ;  
Chris Wil l iam Sanchirico, Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With 
Application to English Legal Hist0/)1, 2 AM.  L. & ECON . REV. 342 (2000) ; James 
M .  Griffin & Weiwen Xiong, The Incentives to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis o f  
OPEC, 40 J .L .  & ECON . 289 ( 1 997). 
28. See John McMi llan, Selling Spectrum Rights , J .  ECON. P ERSP . ,  Summer 
1 994, at 1 45 ,  1 46 (discussing application of game theory to FCC assignment of 
wavelength l icenses) [hereinafter McMil lan, Spectrum Rights] .  See also John 
McMil lan, Market Design: The Polic_v U>es of Theory, 93 AM.  ECON . REV. 1 39, 
1 39-42 (2003 )  (discussing other successfu l  applications of modem sophisticated 
game theory to the optimal design of economic pol icy). 
29. McMillan ,  Spectrum Rights, supra note 28, at 1 46 ;  Paul  R. Milgrom, 
Game The01y and the Spectrum Auctions, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 77 1 ( 1 998) ; PAUL 
R. MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2003) .  
30 .  McMi llan, Spectrum Rights, supra note 28, at 146 .  
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A. A General Comparison of the Expected- Value and 
Options Models of Lit igation 
Three path-breaking models set the standard for the formal 
economic analysis of the settlement of litigation)! First, Professor 
William Landes explained why most criminal cases involve 
negotiated sentences instead of trial .  32 Second, Professor Richard 
Posner explained why the FTC and other administrative agencies 
settle most regulatory disputes via out-of-court settlements . 3 3  Third, 
Professor John Gould explained why most civi l  cases settle before 
trial .34  The Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) single-person decision 
theory expected-value approach to settlement of litigation 
culminated in Professor Stever Shavell 's model comparing the 
incentives to sue and settle under alternative mles for allocating legal 
costs. 35  
The standard approach in law and economics models to how 
people deal with risk involves assuming that legal decis ion-makers 
maximize their expected uti lities of wealth. This general assumption 
often then is reduced to assuming that legal decision-makers 
maximize the net present discounted values of their expected-wealth 
levels . In other words , neoclassical models  assume that legal 
decis ion-makers have as their util ity function over wealth, the net 
present discounted value of wealth. This  can be  more accurately 
termed an expected-value-of-wealth approach to risk. 
An expected-value approach to the risks in l itigation would 
be appropriate if legal decision-makers in l itigation were locked into 
their initial deci sions . What an expected-value approach to risks 
ignores, however, are the opportunities to make future choices after 
learning more concerning the payoff-relevant risks . In the lawsuit 
context, an expected-value approach neither incorporates nor reflects 
3 1 . See THOMAS J. MICELI ,  ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, 
P ROPERTY, LITIGATION 1 56-80 ( 1 997) (providing an excellent mathematical 
exposit ion of the economics of l it igation and settlement); see also COOTER & 
ULEN,  supra note 1 6 , at 4 1 3 - 1 7 (providing a less technical expos i t ion of an 
economic theory of settlement bargaining) . 
32 .  Will iam M.  Landes, A n  Economic A na(vsis of the Courts, 1 4  J .L .  & 
ECON. 6 1 , 66 ( 1 97 1 ) . 
33 .  Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and 
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD .  399,4 1 6  ( 1 973 ) .  
34 .  John P .  Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD .  279, 
285-86 ( 1 973) . 
35. Steven Shavell ,  Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theo retical A na�>-sis Under 
A lternative Methods for the A llocation of  Legal Costs, 1 1  J .  L EGAL STUD .  55 ,  58 -
6 1 ,63-67 ( 1 982) . 
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the value o f  the flexibil ity provided b y  a plaintiff s  option to 
unilaterally abandon l itigation.36  The values of a plaintiff s  options 
to abandon litigation lead to qualitatively different implications 
concerning the incentives to sue, settle, or go to trial than under the 
usual expected-value approach to lawsuits, and these option values 
can be quite large quantitatively. 
Professor Bradford Cornell was the first scholar to develop 
some of the impl ications of the observation that plaintiffs have 
unilateral options to drop a lawsuit before incurring the cost of a full­
blown trial . 3 7  Professor Cornell showed that the option to drop a 
lawsuit increases a lawsuit ' s  expected payoff, and, hence, the 
incentive to file a lawsuit. Professor Cornell's analysis extends the 
LPG model in which l itigation decisions were based solely on the 
present discounted value of a lawsuit ' s  costs and expected benefits 
by introducing an explicit options approach to l itigation.38  William 
J. B lanton applied Cornell ' s  insights to evaluate the impact of 
changes in evidentiary rules on a plaintiff s  incentive to file a 
lawsuit.39  In particular, Blanton focuses on changes in the 
admissibi l ity of expert scientific testimony resulting from the 
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc .40 B lanton identified four principal ways in 
which any evidentiary, procedural, or substantive rule (or change in 
such a rule) can reduce the value of a p laintiff s  option to unilaterally 
drop litigation by: ( 1)  increasing the plaintiff s  l itigation costs, (2) 
front-loading the plaintiff s  l itigation costs, (3) enhancing trial 
precision, and (4) obfuscating the plaintiff s  abi lity to predict a trial 
outcome. 4 1  Frederick Dunbar and his colleagues provided options­
based approaches to nuisance lawsuits , plaintiffs ' attorneys ' behavior 
under contingent fee arrangements in securities l itigation, securities 
litigation reform, and settlements in shareholder class actions .42 
36 .  FED.  R. Clv. P .  4 1  (a)(l ) ( i )  (allowing voluntary dismissal by plaintiff 
under ce11ain circumstances) .  
3 7. Bradford Cornell, The Incent ive to  Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 1 9  
J. LECAL STUD. 1 73 ( 1 990). 
38 .  !d. at 1 76-82. 
39 .  W ill iam J .  Blanton, Reducing t he Value of Plaint[f/'s Litigat ion Option in 
Federal Court : Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals ,  Inc . ,  2 GEO.  MASON L .  
REV.  I 59, 1 60 ( 1 995 ) .  
40 .  509 U.S .  579 ( 1 993) .  
4 1 .  B lanton, supra note 39 , at 1 60-6 1 ,  1 82-90. 
42. Frederick C. Dunbar et a ! .. Shareholder L it igation:  Deterrent Value, 
M erits and L itigants ' Options (Washington University John M .  Olin School of 
Business, Working Paper 95-07-a 26-30, 1 995) .  
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I introduced an options model of contingency multipliers for 
attomey's fees in publ ic  interest and civil rights litigation.43 
Professor Steven Shavell raised a set of related concen1s in his 
affidavit for a civil  rights case where attorney' s  fees were hotly 
contested.44 Professor Shavell ,  however, did not frame his argument 
explicitly in te1ms of the language of an options approach to 
l itigation. Also related are my proposals to incorporate options in 
teaching corporate law45 and to use an options approach toward an 
understanding of why a firm could rationally choose to engage in 
predatory pricing.46 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk provided a theory of NEV 
lawsuits where threats to go to trial are credible due to divisibil ity 
over time of plaintiffs' l i tigation costs.47 The options model of 
li tigation in this Article differs from Professor Bebchuk' s  model 
because in his model litigants face certainty over expected trial 
outcomes and legal fees, while litigants in this Article ' s  model face 
uncertainty over expected judgments, l it igation costs, or  both. The 
plaintiffs in the model of this Article have opportunities not only to 
learn about expected judgments and litigation costs during the 
litigation process, but also to drop l itigation, conditional upon 
information they learn during the course of that l itigation .  The 
divisibi lity of legal costs also forms the basis for Professor Wil liam 
Landes 's  model of unitary versus sequential trials.48  Professor 
43 . See Peter H. Huang, A New Options Themy for Risk Multipliers ol 
Attorney's Fees in Federal Civil Rights L itigation, 73 N.Y.U. L.  REV .  1943 ( 1 998 )  
(developing a new options-based theory of  calcu lating attorney's fees that al lows 
an attorney to assess the p laintiffs probabil ity of prevail ing at tria l  during ditferent 
stages of the lawsuit) .  
44. Affidavit of S teven M.  Shavell a t  2-3 , In re Burl ington Northern,  lnc . ,  
Employment Practices L i tig . ,  Nos. MDL 374 & 78  C269, 1 985 W L  1 80 8  (N.D. Il l .  
May 31, 1 985 ) .  
45 . Peter H .  Huang, Teaching Corporate Lmv From an  Option Perspective, 
34 GA. L. REV.  57 1 ,  5 93-96 (2000). 
46. Peter H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models ol 
Predation, A Revievv ofJohn R. Lott, Jr. , A re Predatory Commirments Credible'? 
Who Should Courts Believe?, 3 GREEN BAG 2 D  437 (2000). 
47. See Lucian Arye B ebchuk, A New The01y Conceming the Credibi!in· and 
Success of' Threats to Sue, 25 J .  LEGAL STUD .  I ( 1 996) ( identifying conditions 
under wh ich a plaintiff with an N EV suit wil l  have a credible threat and succeed in 
extracting a settlement) .  
48 .  Wil l iam M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials · An Economic 
Analysis, 22 J. L ECJAL STUD. 99 (1993) [hereinafter Landes, Sequential Versus 
Unitary Trials]; see also, DOUGLAS G. BAtRD, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 251-
60 ( 1 994) (extending Landes's model to cases in which l it igants possess 
unverifiable infom1ation): Wi l l iam M. Landes, Sequential and Bijill'cated Trials, in 
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L:.1.ndes demonstrated that b ifurcating liability and damages reduces 
expected l i tigati on costs because no need to litigate damages ari ses i f  
n o  l iab il ity exists .49 In tum, such bifurcation increases the 
incenti ves to sue, increases the minimum acceptable settlement, and 
decreases the maximum settlement offer. 50  
B. Comparing the Expected Value and Options Afodels 
ofFrivolous Litigation 
1 .  Defining "Frivolous Lit igation" 
Both the positive and normative analyses of frivolous 
li tigation depend upon one ' s  definition of "frivolous l it igation." As 
Professor Bone details ,  defining a frivolous lawsuit proves more 
complicated than one might initially think. 5 1 
An obvious definition of a frivolous lawsuit is  a case in 
vvhich the plaintiff does not  expect initially to prevai l  at trial . In 
other words, the p laintiff in a frivolous lawsuit is one who has 
suffered no legally recoverable damages because she either ( 1 )  
suffered no harm, or (2) if she did suffer ha1m, she cannot recover it 
from the defendant under existing legal precedent. Her case lacks 
any legal merit because her expected judgment from proceeding to a 
trial is zero . Another, more inclusive definition of frivolous 
l itigation also inc ludes negative-expected-value lawsuits-in other 
words, l itigation in which the expected judgment is greater than zero 
but still remains less than the plaintiff s  costs of proceeding to trial . 
Such negative-expected-value ("NEV") l itigation appears to be 
irrational for plaintiffs to fi le and for defendants to sett le . 
A problem with both of the above definitions of frivolous 
litigation is that they include cases in which litigants are seeking to 
establish new legal theories that differ from existing legal precedent. 
Many people, including the author of this Article, believe that novel 
test cases in such legal areas as civi l rights actions, e .g . ,  actions 
regarding subconscious gender discrimination and unconscious racial 
discrimination, should not be considered frivolous litigation. 
3 THE N EW PALGRA VE D ICT IONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE L avv 438 (Peter 
N ewman ed. ,  1998) (discussing the sequentia l  nature of l i tigation) [hereinafter 
Landes. Sequent ial and Bifit rcated Trials] . 
49. L andes, Seq u ential Versus Un itary Tri als, su pra note 48, at 1 1 3 .  
50 .  L andes, Seq u ential Versus Unitary Tri als, su pra note 48 ,  at 1 1 5 .  
5 1 .  BONE,  su pra note 9 ,  a t  4 1 -43 ;  s ee als o Bone, su pra  note 6 ,  at 529-33 
(discussing the problems i nherent in defining frivolous litigation) .  
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Professor Bone defines a frivolous lawsuit as one in which a 
p laintiff either ( 1 )  actualiy knows that the case completely, or 
virtually completely, lacks any merit under the legal theories being 
alleged; or (2) would have known that the case lacked merit under 
the legal theories being alleged, had the plaintiff conducted a 
reasonable investigation before filing. 5 2  This definition of  frivolous 
litigation clearly differs from negative-expected-value- litigation 
definitions in three ways. First, Bone ' s  definition makes no 
comparison of expected judgments and litigation costs . Second, his 
definition does not include as frivolous those lawsuits described in 
the observation mentioned in the previous paragraph .  Third, this 
definition includes a second component that has no analogues in the 
negative expected value definitions .  In addition, as Professor Bone 
details, posi tive net-expected-value litigation explanations of 
frivolous litigation are unconvincing. 53 This is because positive net­
expected-value l itigation examples of  frivolous i itigation are due to 
either a plaintiff expecting substanti al nonlegal benefits or courts 
making enough mistakes to imply that even a meritless lawsuit has a 
high likelihood of success at trial. \Vhile both of these scenarios are 
possible, neither is a sufficient ly serious problem to warrant costly 
regulatory intervention. 
2 .  Using Options Games t o  Develop a Definition 
of "Frivolous Litigation" 
A number of law and economics models address the dual 
questions of why p laintiffs file frivolous lawsuits and why 
defendants agree to settle frivolous lawsuits . 54 Existing models 
demonstrate that l itigation deemed frivolous according to the 
definitions discussed above can still be worthwhile for the litigants to 
pursue if any of the fol lowing situations applies :  the litigants possess 
different probab ility estimates of the plaintiff prevail ing at tria1 ;5 5  a 
52 .  BONE, supra note 9, at 43; Bone. supra note 6, at 533. 
53. BONE, supra note 9, at 44-45 ;  Bone, supra note 6, at 534-37. 
54 .  See L ucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits vvith Negative Expected Value, in 3 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE D I CTIONARY OF  ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 5 5 1  ( Peter Newman 
ed. ,  1 998) (providing excellent summaries of economic analyses of frivolous 
lawsuits) ;  BONE ,  supra note 9, at 20-68 ;  Bone, supra note 6, at 5 34-77 ;  MICEL I ,  
supra note 3 1 ,  at  1 8 1 -200; Eric B .  Rasmusen, Nuisance Suits, in 2 THE NEW 
PALGR.AVE D ICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 690-93 (Peter Newman ed. ,  
1 998 ) .  
55 .  Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 1 6, at  I 083-84. 
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court makes a legal enor;56  the parties ' l itigation costs are incuned 
sequentially;57 asymmetries exist between the l itigants with respect 
to the size or timing of litigation costs;5 8 plaintiffs have private 
information concerning their cases;5 9 or p laintiffs have the abil ity to 
commit or pre-commit to l itigation.60 
The questions of why a p laintiff would choose to fil e  a 
frivolous lawsuit and why a defendant would agree to settle a 
frivolous lawsuit are inte l lectual ly and practically troublesome. 
Asymmetric information game-theoretic models  answer both 
questions ; however, as the phrase "asymmetric inf01mation" 
suggests, these models  assume that just one side of the l i tigation-in 
other words, e i ther the p laintiff or the defendant-realizes that the 
l itigation is frivolous.6 1 In other words, no mechanism exists for 
communication between the pa1iies as to the truthful  revelation of 
this private information besides l itigation. The 200 1 Nobel Prize in 
Economics recognized the pioneering research of Professors George 
Akerlof, Andrew Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, each of 
whom developed seminal concepts in the economics of symmetric 
information. 62 Such concepts as lemons, pooling, separation, and 
56 .  Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 
J .L .  EcoN .  & ORG. 433 ,  44 1 ( 1 990) (reasoning that even when al l  "potentially 
negligent actors' '  are exerci sing due care, plaintiffs may still bring suit in hope that 
damages may be awarded as a result of court enor). 
57 .  See Bebchuk ,  supra note 47, at 1 0- 1 2  (positing a s ituation where l it igants ' 
costs are not incurred al l  at once but rather spread out over all stages of the 
l it igation) .  
58. David  Rosenberg & Steven Shavel l ,  A Model in Which Suits Are Brought 
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 lNT ' L  REV. L .  & EcoN. 3 ,  9- 1 0  ( 1 985 )  (explaining 
how nuisance suits arise when p laintiffs have a relatively low init ial cost to sue and 
defendants have a greater cost to defend themselves). 
59. See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of 
Legal Disputes, 1 0  INT ' L  REV. L .  & ECON . 3 ,  5 ( 1 990) (discussing the worthwhile 
nature of frivolous lawsuits in situations where plaintiffs have more infonnation 
conceming the i r  cases than do defendants). 
60. P laintiffs can (pre-)commit to l itigation by having lawyers on retainer and 
paying for legal services in advance, whether or not p laintiffs undetiake l it igation 
to tnal .  HERBERT G INTIS ,  GAME THEORY EVOLVING : A P ROBLEM-CENTERED 
l!'lTRODUCTiON TO MODELING STRATEG IC INTERACTION I 00-02 (2000) .  
6 1 .  BONE, supra note 9 .  at 54 ;  B one, supra note 6 ,  at 542, 598-99. 
62 .  See generally George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J .  ECON. 488 ( 1 970) (providing a 
p ioneering model of the economic effects of dishonesty);  A. M ichael Spence, Job 
Market Signaling, 87 Q.J .  ECON . 355  ( 1 973)  ( introduc ing a model i n  which market 
s ignal ing is defined); M i chael Rothschi ld & Joseph E. Stigl itz, Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: A n  Essay in the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q.J .  ECON . 629, 643-48 ( 1 976) (prov iding asymmetric information 
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signaling games play cn1cial roles in asymmetric information game­
theoretic models of frivolous l itigation. 63 
This A11icle allows for the realistic possib i lities that ( 1 )  
initially, neither side o f  the l itigation knows whether h e  or she is a 
participant in a frivolous lawsuit, and (2) perhaps more importantly, 
initially, neither s ide of the l itigation knows for certain whether a 
court will hold that the lawsuit it frivolous . For example,  medical­
malpractice p laintiffs may file lawsuits, in part, from a motivation to 
find out what really happened during a medical procedure that went 
awry. Even if a doctor seems not to be legally negligent, an 
empathetic jury might nonetheless find in favor of a sympathetic 
plaintiff. 
The model in Appendix B of this Article discusses l itigation 
that might possib ly be frivolous. The adverb "possibly" reflects a 
realistic feature of l itigation in the sense that, during its course or 
process, l i tigants and their attorneys will revise their expected costs 
and benefits of proceeding to a trial . In other words, pmiies and their 
lawyers will  lemn that a lawsuit is  frivolous only after the lawsuit 
commences. Frivolous litigation is not rational for plaintiffs to file 
or for defendants to settle, if the l itigation costs are incurred all-at­
once up front or if the expected value of l i tigation does not change 
over the course of l itigation. But l itigation that later turns out to be 
frivolous can be  initially rational for plaintiffs to file and for 
defendants to settle i f  litigation costs are incurred sequentially and if  
the expected value of l itigation changes over the course of  l itigation. 
The model in Appendix B of this Article develops a new 
theory regarding frivolous l it igation that provides conditions under 
which l itigation that may later tum out to be frivolous is initially 
credible for p laintiffs to file and for defendants to sett le .  64 This 
novel theory of possib ly frivolous l i tigation is based upon two 
central features of litigation. The first aspect of litigat ion to note i s  
that, once a p laintiff makes the initial decision to  fi le  a lawsuit, 
Federal Rule of C ivil Procedure 4 l (a) ( l )( i) and its state counterparts 
competitive market equil ibrium models and properties of those equi l ibria) .  For an 
exposition designed for undergraduates, see IAN MOLHO, THE ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION : LYING AND CHEATING lN  M ARKETS AND ORGAN IZATIONS 1 3 - 1 4  
( 1 997)  (providing an exposition of the role of information i n  s i tuations that 
potentially give rise to d ishonesty and breach of promise, and analyzing the 
consequences for people involved) . For a survey, see Joseph E .  St igl itz, The 
Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 
1 1 5 Q.J .  ECON . 1 44 1  passim (2000). 
63 . BONE, supra note 9 ,  at 5 9-64; Bone, supra note 6, at 552-66 .  
64 .  See infra Appendix B,  Proposition l .  
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provide the p laintiff with unilateral options to abandon that lawsuit 
under certain circumstances.65  The second notable feature of 
l itigation is that parties and their attorneys learn information 
concerning their l itigation over the course of that litigation. 
In the particular model presented in Appendix B, no 
asymmetric information exists . Therefore, one party is not learning 
things that the other party already knows. Instead, both parties in 
this Article ' s  model learn information that both parties do not know, 
namely the judgment at trial or the costs of l itigation. In Appendix 
B 's model ,  the parties to litigation share common initial beliefs 
regarding the judgment at trial and the costs of l itigation. Although 
the model does not restrict how parties revise their beliefs over time, 
the model does assume that both sides of the l itigation modify those 
shared initial beliefs in the same manner, and hence ,  share the same 
beliefs in each period of l itigation. In other words, litigants do not 
have to necessarily update their probabi lity beliefs via Bayes ' s  rule, 
but they do have to utilize a common rule for how they adjust 
probability beliefs over time.66 
For a decision-maker, an important benefit of learning 
information is the opportunity to make choices based on that 
additional information. Such potentially valuable opportunities are 
precisely what decision-makers gain from having options.67 This  
central and fundamental insight underlies Professors C .  Frederick 
Beckner' s  and Steven Salop's multistage decision model of 
sequential legal procedure, which computes the optimal standards of 
summa.cy disposition (those minimizing the sum of information and 
error costs) and the optimal sequence of legal and factual issues that 
a court should address .68 That insight also underlies Professor 
Landes ' s  model regarding whether a court should hold separate trials 
for l iabil i ty and damages, as opposed to a unified trial that considers 
65 .  See FED. R. Crv. P .  4 l (a)( 1 )( i )  (allowing  voluntary dismissal by plaintiff) ; 
So l imine & Lippert, supra note 1 1 , at 406- 1 8  (cataloging the various state 
analogues to the federal rule) .  
66. See, e.g. , Peter H .  Huang, Asymptotic Stability of Bayesian Updating for 
Spencian Examples, 1 7  ECON. LETTERS  47 ( 1 985 ) (modeling B ayesian learning  of 
market signal ing equ i l ibria). B ayes 's  rule provides a theoretical method for 
making appropriate inferences in l igh t  of the information contained in statistical 
observations .  
67 .  Ronald A .  Howard, Options, in WISE C HOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES,  AND 
NEGOTIATIONS 8 1  (Richard J.  Zeckhauser et  al .  eds . ,  1 996) .  
68 .  C.  Frederick Beckner, III  & Steven C .  Salop, Decision Theory and 
A ntitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J .  4 1 ,  54 ( 1 999) .  
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both issues .69 Professor Warren F .  Schwartz also recognizes the 
value of options when he demonstrates that separating 
determinations of damages from determinations of l iability could 
reduce l i tigation costs.70  
This Article fil ls  a niche in the literature about poss ibly 
frivolous litigation) ! This Article demonstrates how to 
harmoniously blend an options approach to lawsuits with a strategic 
approach to pretrial settlement bargaining. The analytical model in 
Appendix B of this Article both builds upon and combines two maj or 
literatures. The first literature is research about options, both in law 
in pmiicular and, more generally, in strategic management. The 
second literature consists of game-theoretic models of l itigation. The 
model in Appendix B of this  Article integrates these distinct 
l iteratures into a unified game-theoretic options model of litigation. 
Strategic-options models have only recently begun to appear in the 
financial and management l iteratures .72 These models  can become 
quite mathematically complicated rather quickly.73 
The model in Appendix B of this Article c larifies how and 
why options analysis  explains when possibly frivolous litigation can 
be nonetheless credible for p laintiffs to threaten to file  and for 
69 .  Landes, Sequential and Bifitrcated Trials, supra note 48 ,  at 438-40 .  
70 .  See generally Wancn F .  Schwartz, Severance-A Means of Minimizing 
the Role of Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome of L itigation, 20 
V AND. L .  REV. 1 1 97 ( 1 967) .  
7 1 .  See Bone, supra note 6 ,  at 542 n .8 1 (noting that the existing options 
approach to l it igation fai ls to incorporate theories regarding the strategic 
interactions between l i tigants) .  
72 .  See generally MARION A.  B RACH, REAL O PTIONS IN  P RACTICE 3 3 -74 
(2003) (providing an introduction to games involving shared real options) ;  Han 
T.J .  Smit & L .A .  Ankum, A Real Options and Game- Theoretic Approach to 
Corporate Investment Stralegy Under Competilion, F IN .  MGMT.,  Autumn 1 993 ,  at 
24 1 (applying option theory to evaluate investment strategies in research-and­
development and p ilot programs) . 
73 .  See generally GAME C HOICES:  THE INTERSECTION OF REAL O PTIONS AND 
GAME THEORY (Steven Grenadier ed. , 2000) (presenting selected papers that 
provide theoretical foundations for and practical,  state-of-the-art appl ications of 
strategic real-options models). See also Steven R. Grenadier, Option Exercise 
Games: The Intersection of Real Options and Game Theory, 1. APPL IED CORP.  
FIN . ,  Summer 2000, at 99, 1 00 ( i l lustrating how the use of real  options in 
conjunction with game theory leads to greater insights " into the behavior of 
economic agents under uncertainty"); Steven R. Grenadier, The Strategic Exercise 
o.l Options.· Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets, 5 l J .  
F IN .  1 653 ,  1 653  ( 1 996) (d iscussing the untapped nature of the area of research 
surrounding strategic-option-exercise frameworks and thei r  appl ication in real­
asset markets) ;  VOLLERT, supra note 1 2 , at 7-8 (giving an overview of the basi c  
ideas o f  the real-options approach t o  cap ital-budgeting firms) .  
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defendants to settle .  Of course, not all threatened potentially 
frivolous lawsuits are going to be credible for plaintiffs to threaten to 
file and for defendants to settle. In fact, Appendix B of this Article 
proves that only lawsuits, including possibly frivolous ones, with 
positive-net-abandonment-option values as to their expected costs, 
are credible for plaintiffs to threaten to file and for defendants to 
settle. 74 In other words, the gross-abandonment-option values for 
each stage of l itigation must exceed the cost of that stage of 
l itigation . The model in Appendix B of this Article demonstrates 
that lawsuits that have positive-net-expected values will also have 
positive-net-option values. Thus, any lawsuit with a positive 
expected value ("PEV") will be credible for a plaintiff to threaten to 
file (and actually to fi le) and for a defendant to settle . 75  
All  lawsuits, including NEV lawsuits, must have positive 
gross-abandonment-option value, because any random variable ' s  
abandonment-option value is larger than o r  equal t o  its expected 
value . That conclusion logically fol lows from the notion that the 
abandonment-option value of a random variable equals that random 
variable ' s  expected value when all of the negative value realizations 
of that random variable are replaced by zero . Such a 
conceptual ization of the abandonment-option value of a random 
variable insightfully captures a pragmatic and valuable feature of 
abandonment options :  namely, the flexibility to avoid negative 
outcome realizations of the underlying random variable .  Thus , the 
abandonment-option value of any random variable, including that of 
a plaintiff s  expected judgment at l itigation must be, non-negative by 
definition. 
Several economists have developed the related concept of an 
option value or quasi-option value, both in the particular context of 
environmental preservation and in the more general setting of 
decision-making under conditions of risk. 76 The relationship 
between these option values has caused some confusion in the 
74. See i;?fra Appendix B, Proposition 1 .  
75 .  See inji-a Appendix B ,  Proposition 2 .  
76 .  See, e.g ,  Kenneth J .  Arrow & Anthony C .  F isher, Environmental 
Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J .  ECON. 3 1 2 , 3 1 5  ( 1 974) 
(relating the concept of a quasi-option value to the choice between preservation 
and development of a natural environment); W. Michael Hanemann, Information 
and the Concept of Option Value, 1 6  J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 23 ,  27 ( 1 989) ;  
Claude Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The ' "Irreversibility 
Effect, " 64 AM. EcoN . REV. 1 006, 1 007 ( 1 974) (examining the tendency of a 
dec is ion-maker to adopt an ineversible deci s ion). 
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l iterature. 77 By the phrase "the option value of a random variable ," 
thi s  Article s imply means the expected value of that random 
variable,  but with all of its negative-value realizations replaced by 
zero . From this definition, it follows that, at every date ,  the option 
value of any random variable  exceeds the expected value of any 
random variable .  
The model in Appendix B of this Artic le provides four 
principal ways in which any evidentiary, procedural,  or substantive 
mle (or change in such a ntle) can increase the value of a plaintiff s  
litigation-abandonment option, namely : ( 1 )  increasing the variance 
of trial judgment awards,78  (2) increasing the divisibil ity of 
plaintiffs  legal costs,79  ( 3 )  back-loading plaintiffs  litigation costs,80 
and ( 4) decreasing plaintiff s  total litigation costs. 8 1  
However, the game-theoretic options model o f  l itigation in 
Appendix B of this Article differs from game-theoretic expected­
value models of l i tigation in terms of its predictions . For example, in 
expected-value game-theoretic models of litigation involving risk­
neutral parties, a mean-preserving increase or decrease in the 
variance of judgment at trial has no impact on the incentives to file, 
nor does i t  affect the Nash-equilibrium settlement amounts. But in 
the game-theoretic options model of l itigation involving risk-neutral 
parties, a mean-preserving increase or decrease in the variance of 
judgment at trial increases or, respectively, decreases both the 
incentives to file and the Nash-equilibrium settlement amounts .  82  
The reason for thi s  difference in the predictions of the game­
theoretic expected-value and options models of l itigation is that risk­
neutral litigants only care about expected values, and not variance, in 
the game-theoretic expected-value model of l itigation. In contrast, in 
a game-theoretic options model of l itigation, the option values of the 
settlement amounts from l itigation depend not only upon expected 
77 .  Anthony C. F isher, Investment under Uncertainty and Option Value in 
Environmental Economics, 22 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 1 97 ,  202-03 (2000) 
(offering a unifying framework for different option theories by showing 
equivalence); PAUL G.C .  MENSINK & T I L L  REQUATE, THE D I XIT-P INDYCK AND 
THE ARROW-F ISHER-HANEMANN-HENRY OPTION VALUES ARE NOT EQUIVALENT 
(Univ. of Kiel Dep ' t  of Econ. ,  Working Paper No. 2003-09, 2003 ) (clarifying the 
precise relationship between these different senses of option values). 
78. See infi·a Appendix B, Proposition 6. 
79 .  See infi'a Appendix  B ,  Proposit ion 1 1 . 
80. See iJ�(ra Appendix B ,  Proposition 1 3 . 
8 1 .  See infi·a Appendix B ,  Proposition 1 5 . 
82 .  See infra Appendix B ,  Proposition 6. 
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values, but also upon the variances of random variables even with 
risk-neutral l itigants. 
A comparison of the English nlle, which requires the losing 
party to pay the legal fees of both sides, and the American rule, 
which requires each side to pay for its own legal fees,  also i llustrates 
the difference between the predictions of the game-theoretic 
expected-value and options models of l it igation. A large body of 
theoretical and empirical l iterature exists regarding the incentives to 
file a lawsuit under the American and English rules for allocating 
legal costs . 83 Almost all of thi s  literature focuses exclusively on the 
average values or expected judgments of trials because risk-neutral 
parties care only about means and not about variances, h igher-order 
moments, or any other characteristics of the distributions of trial 
outcomes. Professor Shavell proved that a plaintiff is  more likely to 
file a lawsuit under the American rule than under the English rule if 
the plaintiff does not expect to prevai l because the p laintiff expects 
to pay only for the plaintiffs l itigation costs rather than both sides ' 
l it igation costs. 84 Appendix B of this Article proves that, under 
certain hypotheses, the fi ling of possib ly frivolous litigation i s  more 
l ikely under the English rule than under the American n1le if the 
probabil ity of the plaintiff prevail ing at trial is  sufficiently large or if  
the plaintiffs  expected aggregate l itigation costs sufficiently exceed 
the defendant ' s  expected aggregate litigation costs . 85 
83 .  See, e.g , BONE, supra note 9, at  1 58-86 (examining the costs and benefits 
of switching to the British rule) ; James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, 
Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: The01y and 
Evidence, 38 J .L .  & ECON. 225 ,  248 ( 1 995) (finding that fewer plaintiffs pursue 
c laims under the English rule because l it igation is  more costly); James W. Hughes 
& Edward A. Snyder, A llocation o_fLitigation Costs: A merican and English Rules, 
in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE D I CTrONARY OF ECONOM ICS AND THE  LAW 5 1  (Peter 
Newman ed. , 1 998) (noting that the English rule requires unsuccessfu l  l i tigants to 
pay the winner 's  legal costs, while the American system typical ly does not); 
MICEL I ,  supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 67-70 (discussing the cost-allocation differences 
between the American and English rules) ;  Shavel l ,  supra note 35 ,  at 58-6 1 ,  63-67 
(discussing four methods for allocating legal costs :  each side bears its own costs, 
losing side bears all costs, plaintiff pays only his own costs if  he loses, and 
defendant pays only his own costs if  he loses); Edward A.  Snyder & James W. 
Hughes, The English Rule for A /locating Legal Costs: Evidence Conji·onts TheOI)', 
6 J . L .  ECON . & ORG. 345 ( 1 990) ("An extensive theoretical l i terature has analyzed 
how the al location of legal costs may affect the l i t igation process . . . .  " ) .  
84. Shave! ! ,  supra note 35 ,  at 59, 75, Fig. 2 .  
85 .  See Appendix B ,  Proposit ion 7 .  
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3 .  Applying These Models to the D iscovery 
Context and B eyond 
While Appendix B of this Article develops a multi-period 
options model of lawsuits, this general approach to l itigation can be 
i llustrated by making the simplifying assumption that l itigation 
consists only of tvvo stages, namely discovery and trial . Because 
modem liberai rules of p leading allow the survival of a fairly broad 
c lass of c laims, a plaintiff s  lawyers can engage in discovery if a 
plaintiff files a lawsuit and survives a defendant ' s  motion to dismiss 
for fai lure to state a c laim. 86 B efore discovery,  the p laintiff s  
attorney has only filed suit and initial motions; therefore, legal fees 
up to then are usually small in  comparison to the s izable amounts 
charged during discovery. In fact, an empirical survey of atton1eys 
found that about 50% of the aggregate costs of l it igation are 
discovery costs .  8 7  A plainti ff can avoid incurring those significant 
discovery costs by dropping the lit igation. 
But, even if a plaintiff decides to have her attorney engage in 
discove1y, a p laintiff is  not locked into proceeding to a trial . In fact, 
discovery provides information and opportunities to update beliefs as 
to the probabil ity of the plaintiff s  winning at trial .  Federal and state 
rules governing discovery confer upon parties the legal rights to 
obtain infonnation from other pm1ies before trial via document 
requests, intenogatories, and the deposition of witnesses . 8 8  B ut both 
the attorney-cl ient privilege and the work-product doctrine l imit the 
inforn1ation another party can discover. 8 9  The discovery process 
provides a p laintiffs attorney with the opportunity to conduct 
research into a case; the attorney can develop it further if it looks 
promising in terms of an expected judgment or a settlement, or he 
can recommend that a p laintiff drop the case if it does not look 
prom1smg. For simplicity, assume that discovery completely 
resolves the uncertainty over the actual merits of a case .  Then, after 
86 .  FED.  R .  Clv.  P .  1 2(b)(6) (outl ining the motion to dismiss for fai lure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted). 
87. THOMAS E. WtLLGING ET AL . ,  D ISCOVERY AND D ISCLOSURE P RACTICE,  
PROBLE\1S, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 1 5 (Federal Judicial Center 1 997) .  
8 8 .  See, e. g. , FED .  R .  C !V .  P .  34 (cal l ing for production of documents); FED .  
R .  C iv .  P .  33  (allowing interrogatories to  parties) ; FED .  R. C lv . P .  30  (providing for 
oral deposit ions) ;  FED.  R. C rv .  P .  3 1 (describing written depositions) . 
89 .  See, e. g . ,  Ronald J .  Al len et a l . ,  A Posi tive Th eory of th e Att orn e.v-Cii ent 
Privi lege and t he Work Produ ct D octrin e, 1 9 J .  L EGAL STUD. 3 5 9  ( 1 990)  (offering 
an economic model of the procedural l imits on discovery based upon thei r  
incentive effects). 
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discovery, both sides of the case will know the probability of the 
plaintiffs  prevailing at trial is e ither zero or one. Therefore, in the 
second period, a p laintiff will be will ing to incur the sizable and 
ineversible costs of trial if she learns that she has a sure winner, 
while a plaintiff will drop the case unilaterally if she learns that she 
has a sure loser. 
Many sophisticated game-theoretic models of discovery,90 
discovery rules, 9 1  and efficient discovery exist. 92 Discovery 
generates benefits and costs that differ significantly between 
plaintiffs and defendants.93 A defendant ' s  cost of complying with a 
plaintiffs discovery requests for non-privileged, relevant documents 
can be quite substantial, whether the defendant is a corporation, 
doctor, or even just another individual .94 A clear potential for 
discovery abuse exists because of the externality involved where 
plaintiffs receive the infonnational benefits of discovery but 
defendants bear its costs . 95 So ,  even if the discovery request will 
likely produce benefits that exceed its costs, one party receives the 
benefits from, while another party bears the costs of, discovery.96 
Thus, even if a discovery request i s  socially desirable ,  in the sense 
90. See ,  e.g. , Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L .  Rubinfeld, An E con om ic Model 
of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.  435,  438 ( 1 994) (providing a general 
strategic analysis of discovery); see als o Bruce L. Hay, Civil D is covery: Its Effects 
and Optimal Sc ope, 23 J. L EGAL STUD . 48 1 ,  484-500 ( 1 994) (extending Cooter & 
Rubinfc ld 's  analysis) .  
9 1 .  See ge nerally Joel Sobel ,  A n  A nalysis of' D iscovery Rules, 52  LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB . 1 33 ( 1 989) (discussing specific game-theoretic models) .  
92. Robert Mnookin & Robert Wi lson, A J\!fodel of Effic ie n t  D isc overv, 25 
GAiVIES & ECON. B EHAV. 2 1 9 ,  220 ( 1 998) .  
93 .  FED.  R .  C lv . P .  26(b)(2) ( i i i )  l imits discovery to requests for which 
compliance does not impose a burden that is l ikely to outweigh the benefits. F ED .  
R. C lv .  P. 26(g)(3 ) allows courts to  impose appropriate sanctions for violations. 
94. FED. R. Clv. P .  26(b )( 1 )  provides a broad scope for discovery, including 
information that need not be admissible at trial so long as the information 
requested ' 'appears reasonab ly calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. ' '  
95. See Frank H .  Easterbrook, D isc overy as A buse, 69 B . U .  L.  REV . 635, 636 
( 1 989 )  (expressing judicial concern over di scovery abuse) .  But see L inda S .  
rviul lcnix,  D isc ov ery in Disa rray : The Pervasive Jvfvth of Pervas it·e D iscover}' 
Abuse a nd the Conseq ue n ces /o r  Unj'ou nded Rulemak in g, 46 STAN.  L .  REV. ! 393 , 
1 432-42 ( 1 994) ( noting the anecdotal and survey nature of evidence about 
discovery abuse) .  
96 .  John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb : The Drnamics of . . 
Co operatio n, Nuclear Dete rren ce. and Disc o1·eJy Abuse, 69 B.U .  L. REV. 569, 58 \ 
( 1 989) (differentiating between informat ional benefits and in1posit ional benefits of 
discovery requests) .  
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that its benefits exceed its costs, i t  can provide a small p laintiff an 
advantage over a large defendant, as Professors David Rosenberg 
and Steven Shavell demonstrate in their analysis of NEV lawsuits.97 
Although both sides to a lawsuit can make discovery requests, a 
plaintiff does not incur much cost in complying with discovery 
requests when she lacks "truckloads of documents ."98  The cost of 
complying with discovery requests i l lustrates how lit igation­
abandonment options may create problems akin to a strategy of 
raising rival ' s  costs in the context of business competition and the 
game-theoretic industrial-organization l iterature. 99 
More generally, a lawsuit consists not just of discovery and 
trial stages .  Several other stages exist, as well .  The plaintiff s  
lawyer files a complaint; the defendant' s  lawyer files a pre-answer 
motion to dismiss the plaintiff s  complaint, e .g . ,  under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss "for fai lure to state a 
claim upon which rel ief can be granted;" 1 00 the defendant' s  lawyer 
answers the compliant by making admissions, 1 0 1  making denials, 1 02 
rais ing affirmative defenses, 1 03 or filing counterc laims or cross 
claims; 1 04 the lawyers file third-party complaints; 1 05 the lawyers 
amend or supplement their p leadings; 1 06 the lawyers make any 
required automatic disclosures ; l 07 the lawyers conduct, obj ect to, 
and respond to discovery requests for the production of 
documents; 1 08 the lawyers send and the parties must sign answers to 
interrogatories ;  1 09 the lawyers take oral depositions ; 1 1 0 the lawyers 
97 .  Rosenberg & Shavell ,  supra note 58 ,  at 3 .  
98 .  See also COOTER & ULEN ,  supra note 1 6, at 4 1 2  ( i l lustrating how 
"[ e ]xternal izing compliance costs provides an incentive for discovery abuse"). But 
see C LASS ACTION (20th Century Fox 1 99 1 )  (depicting how a defendant's  lawyer 
can bury a plaintiffs  attorney with literal ly tmckloads of documents in complying 
with a discovery request). 
99. See. e.g. , Wil liam P. Rogerson, A Note on the lncentive for a Monopolist 
to Increase Fixed Costs as a Barrier to Entry, 99 Q.J .  ECON . 399 passim ( 1 984) 
(demonstrating why raising fixed costs benefits a dominant firm). 
1 00 .  FED .  R. Crv.  P .  1 2(b)(6) .  
1 0 1 .  FED.  R. Clv.  P .  8(b) . 
1 02.  /d. 
I 03 .  F E D .  R. C !v .  P .  8(c ) . 
1 04. FED. R. Clv. P .  1 3 .  
1 05 .  F E D .  R .  C !v .  P .  1 4 . 
1 06 .  FED .  R. C !V .  P .  1 5 .  
1 07 .  FED .  R. C lv .  P .  26(a). 
1 08 .  FED .  R. C lv .  P .  34. 
1 09 .  FED.  R.  C!V.  P .  3 3 .  
1 1 0 .  F E D .  R.  Crv.  P .  30 . 
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request and comply with court orders for independent physical or 
mental medical examinations ; 1 1 1  the lawyers promulgate and 
respond to requests for admissions; 1 1 2 the lawyers file and respond 
to motions for directed verdict; 1 1 3  the lawyers proceed to trial by, 
among other things, conducting opening arguments, examining and 
cross-examining witnesses, 1 1 4  presenting non-testimonial evidence,  
and making closing arguments ; the lawyers file and respond to 
motions for judgment as a matter of law before a verdict (also known 
under some state rules of c ivil  procedure as motions for summary 
judgment) ; 1 1 5 the lawyers file and respond to motions for judgment 
as a matter of law after the verdict (also known under some state 
rules of civil procedure as motions for j .n .o .v . ,  which stands for 
judgment non obstante veredicto) ; 1 1 6 the lawyers fi le and respond to 
motions for a new trial ;  1 1 7  and, finally, the lawyers file and respond 
to motions to alter or amend a judgment. l i S Thus ,  litigation i s  a 
multistage process that provides plaintiffs not just a single option but 
instead, a sequence of abandonment options analogous to those 
found in sequential investment. 
4. Properties of L it igation Abandonment Options 
L itigation abandonment options have several interesting 
features .  First, plaintiffs do not pay l itigation abandonment option 
premiums to defendants but instead, to plaintiffs' attorneys . If  
plaintiffs are not paying clients, but instead are suing under 
contingency fee arrangements or attorney fee award statutes, then 
plaintiffs ' attorneys incur litigation-abandonment-option premiums 
up front. Second, defendants provide these litigation abandonment 
options to plaintiffs by virtue of their activity choices and the 
relevant substantive and procedural laws . Thus, changes in either 
procedural or substantive law can alter the value of l itigation 
abandonment options . Third, plaintiffs ' l itigation abandonment 
options are similar to the options that a natural resources company, 
oil refinery,  pharmaceutical company, petrochemical firm, or, in fact, 
I l l . FED.  R. C lv .  P .  3 5 .  
1 1 2 . FED.  R .  C iv .  P .  36 .  
1 1 3 .  FED.  R .  C iv .  P .  56 .  
1 1 4. FED .  R .  C!V. P. 43 (a) . 
1 1 5 .  FED .  R .  C lv .  P .  50(a) .  
1 1 6 .  FED .  R .  ( IV .  P. 50(b) .  
1 1 7 .  FED .  R. C lv .  P .  59(a). 
1 1 8 .  FED.  R .  C !V .  P .  59(e) .  
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any business that is engaged in research and development ("R&D") 
has to abandon product or process innovation . l l 9 But there is  a very 
important difference between a p laintiffs  litigation abandonment 
options and those in R&D. On the one hand, lawsuits are wasteful 
from the joint perspective of  p laintiffs, defendants, and perhaps ,  
society as a whole if the costs imposed upon a court, a judge, and 
jury (if any) exceed the precedent and process values from 
adjudication of the litigation. In l itigation, the plaintiff and the 
defendant will  both lose if they make investments in a lawsuit, as 
opposed to resolving their differences via some alternative dispute 
resolution method. On the other hand, a corporation engaging in 
R&D, as well as its employees, its equity owners, its debt holders, its 
current and future customers, the surrounding community, and 
poss ibly other third parties, al l stand to gain from the development 
and sale of a new product. Thus, even though litigation 
abandonment options are similar to other familiar examples of 
options, litigation abandonment options differ from other existing 
options in several important ways. 
I I I .  L IMITATI ONS O F  STRATEGIC L IT IGATION OPTION ANALYSIS 
This part of the Article appraises limitations of an options 
game-theoretic approach to l itigation. Some of these l imitations in 
the particular context of litigation are the result of general behavioral 
limitations on game-theoretic analysis . l 20 First, there are cognitive 
limitations as to how people conceptualize, frame, make, process,  
and understand choices over time. 1 2 1  Second, traditional, or non-
1 1 9 .  See, e. g. , Tenence W.  Fau lkner, AppZv in g "Optio n s  Thi nki n g "  to R&D 
Valu atio n, 39 RES . TECH .  MGMT., May-June 1 996, at 50  (discussing the 
imp lications of using an options approach for the formulation of R&D strategies) ;  
Graham R .  Mitchell & Wil l iam F .  Hamilton, Managin g  R &D as a Str ategic 
Optio n, RES .  TECH . MGMT. , May-June 1 988, at 1 5  (explaining why companies 
might have to abandon such innovation) . 
1 20 .  See generally COLIN F .  CAMERER, B E HAVIORAL GAME T H EORY:  
EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION (2003) (providing an excel lent 
overview of experimental research about how people actually play games) .  
1 2 1 .  See gen eraiZv TIME  AND DECISION : ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE ( George Loewenstein et a ! .  eds . ,  2003) 
(presenting a fascinating interdisciplinary collection of art ic les about the 
phi losophical, evolutionary, and neurobiological underpinnings; theoretical 
perspectives; and practical appl ications of the psychology and economics of  time 
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psychological, game-theoretic models assume that people do not  
experience any emotions or feelings. Both of these l imitations are 
particularly serious in l itigation settings because most litigation is 
quite time-consuming and emotionally draining, if  not protracted and 
contentious. It is possible that, even if litigants themselves are 
myopic and overly emotional, their lawyers might be more farsighted 
and less emotional . Unfortunately, however, lawyers may 
exacerbate cognitive and emotional issues, due to conflicts of interest 
and repeat-play considerations, such as those involving developing a 
reputation for being tough or playing hardball in pretrial settlement 
negotiations. 1 22 This part of the Article considers these limitations 
in tum and explores possible responses to such l imitations. 
A. Cognitive Limitations of Strategic Options Analysis 
The standard procedure for solving dynamic games of 
complete information util izes a technique known as "backward 
induction." l 23 This method for calcu lating an equil ibrium solution 
to an extensive form game of perfect information starts by 
determining the optimal choice for the player who moves last. I t  
continues by then determining the optimal course of action for the 
player who moves penultimately, and so forth, unt i l  determining the 
optimal decision for the player who moves first . An altemative way 
to understand backward induction focuses on the sequential 
rationality of players ' strategies. The requirement of sequential 
rationality relates to another intuitive notion : that of credibil ity of 
threats .  Professor Bebchuk systematically applied the credibility 
constraint in his approach to NEV lawsuits . l 24 
preference); CHOICE OVER TIME (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds . ,  1 992) 
(presenting articles about how people actually make choices over time). 
1 22 .  See, e.g. , Ronald J. G i lson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through 
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Betvveen Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM.  L .  
REV. 509, 5 1 4- 1 5  ( 1 994) ( i l lustrating the possibi l ity o f  a prisoner's di lemma 
situation in which both lit igants withhold information from each other, and their 
lawyers file motions to compel disclosure) . But see, e.g. , A. Mitchell Pol insky & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients , 5 AM.  L .  & 
ECON. REV.  1 65 ,  1 67 (2003 ) (proposing a variation of the standard contingent-fee 
system for compensating law·yers that would overcome the confl ict of interest 
betvveen c lients and their lawyers) .  
1 23 .  Robert Gibbons, An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory, J .  ECON . 
PERSP . ,  Winter 1 997 ,  at 1 27 ,  1 45 .  
1 24 .  Bebchuk, supra note 4 7 ,  at 1 -2, 4-5, 7-8 ,  1 4- 1 5 , 23 -24 (analyzing how a 
p laintiff involved in a h igh-cost lawsuit with l ittle chance of success can threaten 
the defendant into settlement). 
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As Professor Bebchuk noted, backward-induction arguments 
have become standard in studying multi-period strategic 
environments . l 25 The history of backward-induction arguments 
dates back at least to Zermelo ' s demonstration that in chess, e ither 
white or b lack can ensure itself a draw regardless of how the other 
side p lays . 1 26 Later, the philosopher Kierkegaard said� "It i s  quite 
true what Philosophy says : that Life must be understood backwards. 
But that makes one forget the other saying: that i t  must be lived­
forwards . " l 2 7  S imilarly, backward-induction arguments presume 
that decision-makers have the computational abi li ty to , and in fact 
do, correctly forecast all of the future choices that are to be made in a 
game. The longer or more complex a game, the more descriptively 
problematic is the assumption of rational expectations about strategic 
decisions . l 2 8  
Numerous experiments demonstrate that people are quite 
limited in their abi lities to perform backwards induction for even 
relatively s imple game situations . l 29  The inconsistency between 
empirical experimental-play results and backward-induction-based 
solutions for a famous game called "the centipede game" i l lustrates 
the predictive l imitations of using backward induction arguments for 
sufficiently lengthy games. 1 30 Even in only two-stage or three-stage 
sequential-bargaining experimental games, subjects actually p lay 
very differently from backward-induction-based equilibrium 
solutions for those games. 1 3 1  One way to resolve these and related 
backward-induction paradoxes is  to posit a small degree of 
uncertainty into the players ' knowledge of what motivates other 
players. 1 32 
1 25 .  Bebchuk, supra note 4 7 ,  at 6 n .  7 . 
1 26 . E.  Zermelo, Uber eine A nwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie 
des Schachspie/s, 2 P ROC. F IFTH lNT' L CONG. MATHEMATICIANS 50 1 ( 1 9 1 3) .  
1 27 .  THE DIARY O F  S0REN KIERKEGAARD Pt .  5 ,  sec . 4 ,  no.  1 36 ,  1 843 entry 
(Peter Rohde ed. , 1 960). 
1 28 .  See generally DAVID  M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC 
MODELLING 77-82, 1 47-48 ( 1 990) .  
1 29 .  See, e.g. , THEODORE C.  B ERGSTROM & JOHN H.  M ILLER, EXPERIMENTS 
W ITH EcoNmvl lC PRINCIPLES 3 95 ( 1 997) (evaluating the results of a sequential­
bargaining experiment based on the hypothetical sale of a bicycle) .  
1 30 .  The techn ical term for backward- induction-based solutions to an 
extensive form game of perfect information is that of subgame perfect (Nash) 
equi l ibria. 
1 3 1 .  B ERGSTROM & MILLER, supra note 1 29 ,  at 374-76, 394-96 .  
1 32 .  See, e.g. , JAMES D .  MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL 
SCIENTISTS 279 ( 1 994) (resolving the chain store paradox). 
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The game-theoretic analysis of litigation-abandonment 
options in Appendix B of this Article utilizes backward-induction 
arguments to analyze lawsuits, despite the fact that the above 
concerns are disturbing and convincing. Uti lizing backward­
induction arguments to analyze lawsuits is appropriate because 
litigants have financial and psychological incentives to be 
sequentially rational .  Indeed, litigants arc more l ikely to be 
sequentially rational than are experimental subjects, who may face 
art ificial time constraints and might lack the motivations of greed 
and other emotional responses frequently found in litigation. l 33  
Also, even if the litigants themselves fai l  to  be sequentially rational 
due to , for example ,  cognitive difficulties, they hire lawyers who 
provide not only legal knowledge and expertise, but also negotiating 
experience and professionalism. Presumably, part of being a 
professional is being unwill ing to make and carry out incredible 
threats .  In a sense, then, litigation involves professionals who have 
reasons to be sequentially rational . Of course, both defendants ' and 
plaintiffs ' attorneys are often repeat players and their behavior might 
be rational across cases as opposed to within any given case. A final 
defense is the often made hand-waving argument that market 
reputation and competition discipline lawyers who fai l  to be 
sequentially rational .  In other words, lawyers who fai l  to be 
sequentially rational by making and carrying out incredible threats 
will become known for doing so and lose business to lawyers who do 
not do so.  They will lose business because canyring out an incredible 
threat means by definition that carrying out such a threat hurts the 
plaintiff. 
B. Emotional and Psychological Factors zn Strategic 
Options Analysis 
Almost al l  formal economic models of litigation focus 
primarily on the monetary incentives to sue, settle, or proceed to a 
trial . Professors Huang' s  & Wu' s  psychological game-theoretic 
models of litigation provide an exception. Their models demonstrate 
how emotions such as anger, outrage, and shock can prevent or delay 
settlement in litigation by changing the incentives of parties to sue, 
to settle, or to go to trial . l 34 In addition, the United States Supreme 
1 33 .  Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in L irigation, 1 2  
I NT ' L  REV. L .  & ECON . 3 1 , 32 ( 1 992) .  
1 34 . !d. at 32 .  Se e also W illiam G .  Morrison, Instincts as Reflex Choice: 
Does Loss of Temper Have Strategic Value? ,  3 1  J. ECON . B EHAV.  & ORG. 335 ,  
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Court described and endorsed the wide-ranging rights of  parties to 
control and participate in their l itigation based upon a p sychological 
theory of process-based value to prec luding feelings of unjust 
treatment. l 3 5  Empirical and experimental psychological research 
demonstrates that people are more likely to accept an adverse 
outcome and to believe that an adjudicatory process is fair if they 
have the opportunity to personally participate in that process,  that is, 
have the adjudicator hear their stories .  i 36 Emotional considerations 
usually predominate in particular legal areas, inc luding, but not 
necessarily l imited to batte1y, child custody, criminal offenses, 
defamation, divorce, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, medical malpractice, 
products liabil ity (especially involving bodily injury) ,  and worker' s  
compensation . These areas often involve hot emotions because they 
involve physical or emotional banns or invasions. 
Whether a lawsuit has a positive or negative expected value 
to a plaintiff, a lawsuit always has net negative expected value to a 
defendant ( ignoring the fi l ing of counterclaims) because of a 
defendant ' s  l itigation costs. Indeed, avoiding such costs i s  often the 
rationale for settlement. In reality, it is not just legal costs, but also 
the opportunity costs, such as the prospective harm to a defendant' s  
reputation, that might lead a defendant to settle a lawsuit by 
effectively purchasing the p laintiff s  litigation continuation options. 
An often used pejorative term is that of "vexatious litigation." In a 
well-known quotation from a securities-fraud lawsuit, the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Will iam Rhenquist, spoke of the 
danger of "vexatious litigation" that could result from the 
prosecution of "a complaint which by objective standards may have 
3 54 ( 1 996) (demonstrating that, in games based upon bio logical-confl ict models,  
subord inate players can benefit from losing their  tempers in asymmetric contests 
with dominant opponents, and such an instinctual reaction can be robust against 
evolutionary pressures and persist over time)� Glenn Feltham & W i ll iam G .  
Monison, C iv i l  Disputes, the A l location of Legal Costs and E motional L itigation 
( 1 995) (unpubl ished manuscript on file with author) (modeling the possibi lity of a 
plaintiff reacting emotionally to a defendant ' s  low pretrial sett lement offer by 
becoming insulted, losing her temper, and making a reflex choice  to proceed to 
trial instead of settle, regardless of the monetary consequences o
'
f her doing so). 
1 3 5 .  See Carey v. P iphus, 435 U . S .  247, 260-6 1 ( 1 978)  (stating that "a 
purpose of procedural due process is  to convey to the individual a feel ing that the 
govemment has dealt vvith him fairly") .  
1 3 6 .  See, e.g. , E .  ALLAN L IND  & TOM R.  TYLER ,  THE SOC IAL  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26-40, 6 1 -83 ,  93- 1 27 ( 1 988) (presenting research that 
examines how procedural factors affect people ' s  perceptions of faimess of dispute 
resolutions) .  
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very l ittle chance of success at trial" because, among other reasons, 
"the very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay nonnal 
business activity of the defendant which is total ly unrelated to the 
lawsuit . " l 3 7  Exactly what constitutes a vexatious lawsuit is  
debatable in the same manner as precisely what constitutes a 
frivolous lawsuit. But, certainly, the heated emotional 
considerations that motivate a p laintiff to use a lawsuit to harass a 
defendant provide an example of a nonmonetary aspect of vexatious 
1 i tigation. 
A recent set of psychological experiments indicates that 
decis ion-makers generally overvalue their options and exhibit a 
will ingness to invest greater effort and larger sums of money to keep 
options viable,  even when such options have l ittle intrinsic value_ l 3 8  
The tendencies uncovered experimentally were robust with regard to 
decision-makers ' experiences, infonnation about outcomes, and 
saliency about option costs. 1 39 In other words, options may offer 
subjective values exceeding their decis ion-theoretic value for two 
psychological reasons. First, people sometimes derive pleasure from 
merely having the right to choose. 1 40 This phenomenon is perhaps 
related to a desire for or i l lusion of controJ . 1 4 1  Second, people 
sometimes experience loss aversion and a type of endowment effect 
for options. l 42 This phenomenon relates to the phenomenon of 
litigants experiencing framing effects as described by prospect 
theory, causing frivolous litigation and lack of settlement during 
pretrial bargaining. 1 43 
1 3  7 . B lue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 42 1 U . S .  723 ,  740 ( 1 975) .  
1 3 8 .  Shin  & Ariely, su pra note 1 5 , at  1 .  
1 39 .  Shin & Ariely, supra note 1 5 , at 4 .  
1 40 .  But s ee Ziv Cam10n e t  a l . ,  Optio n A ttachme nt: Wh en De lib erating 
Makes Choos ing Feel Like Los ing, 30  J. CONSUMER RES. 1 5 , 1 9-20 (2003) 
(presenting experimental evidence that considering options more c losely may 
induce consumers to become attached to choice options and feel discomfort after 
choice ) ;  Sheena S .  Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, Whe n  Cho ic e  is D emotiv ati ng :  Co n 
One D es ire Too Much of a Good Thing, 79 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.  995, 
996- 1 00 1  (2000) (providing both field and laboratory experimental evidence of 
part ic ipants reporting higher sati sfact ion when their options were l imited) .  
1 4 1 .  E llen J. Langer, Experiment 2:  Effec ts of Cho ic e  on th e J//usion ol 
Control, 32 J .  PERSONALlTY & Soc. PSYCHOL.  3 1 1 .  3 1 5 - 1 7  ( 1 975 ) .  
1 42 .  Jd. a t  3 1 2 . 
1 43 .  See, e. g. , Chris Guthrie, Fruming Frivolous Liti gatio n: A Psycholo gical 
Theon·, 67 U. 011 .  L .  REV. 1 63 ,  1 68 (2000) (proposing that the decision frame in 
frivolous l i t igation i nduces risk-averse behavior in defendants and risk-seeking 
behavior in plaintiffs) ;  Jeffrey J .  Rachl inski ,  Gains, Loss es, and th e P.sycho logy ol 
L it igatio n, 70 S .  CAL. L .  REV . 1 1 3 , 1 76 ( 1 996) (suggesting that the ut i l ity model of 
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Finally, the emotional and psychological costs of exercising 
options in general may prevent people from exercising options that 
are monetarily inexpensive . For example, most prospective law 
students probably undervalue the value of beginning a legal 
education because they ignore their options to drop out. In other 
words, a student can decide to abandon legal education after the first 
class, day, week, semester, or year of law school (or in fac t  anytime 
before graduation) . However, many law students refuse to become 
legal drop-outs because doing so is  too embarrassing or costly in 
terms of their psyche or ego . As with most options to abandon some 
course of action, people may feel a compulsion to not be quitters in 
their own eyes or in those of certain observers, such as family 
members, friends , or even political constituencies, in the case of 
politic ians who do not want a reputation for being inconsistent. The 
option to modify a course of action might be less emotionally or 
psychologically costly than the option to abandon or discontinue a 
course of action (even though abandonment is  a particu lar form of 
modification) .  Thus, a student might not drop out of  law school, but 
might instead choose to change her course of study or legal career 
path. 
In conclusion, litigants experience both cognitive limitations 
as well as emotional and psychological factors that are not present in 
strategic options analysis of l itigation . There are some reasons to 
believe that lawyers might experience less of those cognitive 
limitations and emotional and psychological factors in their decision­
making, as compared to their c lients. But c learly it would be helpful 
to conduct further empirical research concerning how lawyers 
actually behave and theoretical research about how to incorporate 
cognitive l imitations as well as emotional and psychological factors 
into strategic options analysis of l itigation. 
IV. OTHER L EGAL APPLICATIONS OF OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
This part of the Article focuses on applying options analysis 
to regulate other litigation options in civil procedure, preclusion law, 
constitutional law, and family law.  Constraints of space and time 
permit only a brief glimpse of the ful l  potential of these legal 
appl ications . Although all the possible appl ications below only 
l it igation is less useful in  describ ing the finer detai ls of l i tigation than behavioral­
decision theory) .  
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pertain to civil actions, numerous legal options in the areas of 
criminal law and procedure, such as options provi ded by 
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining also exist. 
A .  Other L itigation Options: An Overview 
Thus far, this Article has analyzed lawsuits from the 
perspective of the options that a p laintiff has to unilaterally abandon 
or drop l itigation. Other l itigation options also arise naturally in 
l itigation and civil procedure. For example, some states allow for 
the practice of additur, 1 44 in which a court denies a plaintiff's  
motion for a new trial, conditional on  a defendant accepting more 
liabil ity than a jury awarded. From an options perspective, additur 
involves a court presenting a defendant with an option to accept 
more liabi lity than a jury award in exchange for a p laintiff not being 
permitted to exercise her option to file and to later abandon a new 
trial .  
In the medical malpractice area, Professor Jeffrey O 'Connell, 
along with several co-authors , has proposed a reform plan under 
which a physician has the option to make a plaintiff an early offer to 
pay for economic losses in the form of medical expenses and iost 
wages. l 45 In exchange for accepting such an offer, a plaintiff 
relinquishes her option to file and later to abandon l itigation for 
damages to compensate for non-economic harms, unless that 
plaintiff can prove that the physician was guilty of gross criminal 
negligence.  Applying options theory provides a qualitative, if not 
quantitative, analysis  of both a physician' s  option to make such early 
offers and the forgone value of a patient' s  option to abandon 
litigation seeking damages for pain and suffering. 
1 44 .  Note that the Supreme Colll1 prohibi ted additur in federal practice as 
violative of the Seventh Amendment in Dmick v. Schiedt, 293 U . S .  474, 478 
( 1 935 ) .  
1 45 .  See. e.g. , Jeffrey O 'Connel l & Andrew S .  Boutros, Treating lvfedical 
Malpractice Claims Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L.  REV. 3 73 (2002) (comparing the l iability of corporate officers with the 
l iab i lity of physicians) ; Jeffrey O 'Connell & Patrick B .  Bryan, More Hippocrates, 
Less Hypocrisy: "Early Offers " as a Means of Implementing the Institute of 
Medicine 's Recommendations on Malpractice Law, 1 5  J .L .  & H EALTH 23 (2000-
0 1 )  (proposing that the current tort system does not promote patient safety); Jeffrey 
O 'Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Ofers as a Simple, If Second­
Best, A lternative To Tort Lmv, 78 NEB .  L .  REV. 858  ( 1 999) (arguing for a binding 
"early offers" neo no-fault system); Jeffrey O 'Connell & James F. Neale, HMO 's, 
Cost Containment, and Earl_v Offers: New Malpractice Threats and A Proposed 
Reform, 1 4  J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L .  POL 'Y .  287 ( 1 998) .  
80 THE REVIE W OF LITIGA TION [Vol . 23 : 1  
F inally, an options perspective to l itigation can provide not 
only descriptive or positive analysis ,  but also prescriptive or 
normative analysis of litigation-related behavior. For example, 
options theory suggests that a rational and far-sighted manufacturer 
should factor into the price of her product a per-unit amount for 
covering the option values of  products l iabi lity cases, which are 
larger than merely expected l itigation costs or damage awards from 
defending or settl ing products l iabi l ity cases . l 46 But if only a s ingle 
manufacturer in a reasonab ly competitive market raises her prices to 
cover the option values, instead of expected values of product 
liabil i ty ,  then it might price itself out of business relative to its 
competitors in the short run .  Another example of prescriptive or 
normative analysis comes from realizing that, all other things equal , 
the deterrence impact of settlements or trials based upon the option 
values of litigation exceeds the deterrence impact of settlements or 
trials based upon their expected monetary damage awards . I 47 This 
relative comparison applies equally forcefully to the deterrence of 
harms from accidents, contract breaches, governmental takings of  
private property, and nuisances. 1 48 A final example is to analyze 
how l itigation abandonment options affect Professors George 
Priest ' s  and Benjamin Klein ' s  selective-litigation hypothesis that a 
nonrandom sample of cases filed will  result in trial . l 49 
1 46 .  See also B lanton, supra note 39 ,  a t  1 85 n . l 35 ,  1 86 n . 1 3 7  (comparing 
l itigation costs to stock options) ; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1 6, at 345 -46 
(noting "the cost of l iabi l ity wi l l  be captured in the price"); M !CEU, s upra note 3 1 ,  
at 29-32 (discussing the accident risk factors i nvolved in  product l i ab i l ity cases) ; 
A. MITCHELL POL INSKY,  AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS,  97-98,  9 8  
tbl. 1 1  ( 3 d  ed. 2003) (providing a hypothetical numerical example of the price of a 
product including expected acc ident losses). 
1 47 .  See. e.g. , A.  Mitchel l  Pol insky & Daniel L .  Rubinfeld,  The Deterrent 
Ef ects ol Settlements and Trials, 8 INT ' L REV. L .  & EcoN . 1 09 ,  1 1 0- 1 2  ( 1 988)  
(d iscussing the social desi rabil ity of deten·ence provided by trials). 
1 48 .  Robert D. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of 
Precaution, 73 CAL.  L .  REV. 1 ,  3-5 ( 1 985) .  
1 49 .  George L .  Priest & Benj amin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 1 3  J. L EGAL STUD. 1 ( 1 9 84) .  See also Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the 
Selection Effect.· A New Theoretical Framevvork with Empirical Tests, 1 9  J. LEGAL 
STUD.  33  7 passim ( 1 990) (presenting a theory for testing major l i tigati on models) ;  
Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Trial, 
22 J. L EGAL STUD .  1 87 passim ( 1 993)  (presenting a selection of d isputes theory 
that does not require information on the identity of the l itigants); MICEL I ,  supra 
note 3 1 ,  at 1 5 8-59 (discussing the 50% rule for selection of disputes) ;  George L .  
Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning jron1 Wittman 's Mistakes, 
1 4  J. L EGAL STUD. 2 1 5  passim ( 1 985)  (restating the selection hypothesis for 
predicting which suits wi l l  be settled) ; L .  Stanley & Don Coursey, Empirical 
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B. Precluding Legal Options 
8 1  
This Article demonstrates that many procedural and 
substantive legal rules provide options that are valuable because they 
provide flexibility .  It is well known, conversely, that inflexibility 
can be advantageous in strategic bargaining. 1 50 Economists and 
game theorists often speak of people util izing (pre )commitment 
devices to improve their bargaining pos1twn; for example, 
automobile salespeople, one member of a couple, and employers 
often claim their hands are tied. An options perspective about law 
also reveals that numerous legal doctrines and rules increase the 
price of, if not preclude, certain other legal options .  For example, 
both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct preclude certain behavior that would 
otherwise be available to lawyers as options. For another example, 
both state and federal sovereigns have developed a number of self­
limitation doctrines and statutes that prevent them from exercising 
their ful l  adjudicatory, constitutional authority over non-local 
cases . l 5 1  Most prominent among these subconstitutional restrictions 
Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 1 9  J. 
LEGAL STU D .  1 45 passim ( 1 990) (using experimental methods to test the Priest and 
Klein hypothesis and other hypotheses on the private choice to l i tigate or settle); 
Robert F. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis without the 50 Percent Rule: 
Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J .  LEGAL STUD. 209 passim ( 1 995) (testing the 
Priest-Klein selection effect) ; Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the 
Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 1 03 J. POL. ECON. 229 passim 
( 1 99 5) (developing imp lications of the selection hypothesis of Priest and Klein for 
the relationship between trial rates and p laintiff win rates) ; Joel Waldfogel, 
Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRA VE D ICTlONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 4 1 9  (Peter Newman ed. ,  1 998) (comparing Priest and 
Klein ' s  selective litigation hypothesis w ith the alternative asymmetric information 
("AI") theory) ;  Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J .  
LEGAL STUD.  1 85 passim ( 1 985)  (proposing an alternative model to Priest and 
Kle in 's  hypothesis that reaches contrary conclusions about the l itigation process) ; 
Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for 
Trial: A Stuc(v of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 1 7  J. LEGAL STUD. 
3 1 3  passim ( 1 988)  ( identifying case characteristics that influence the selection of 
cases for trial) .  
1 50 .  See generally JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES ,  AND MANAGERS 
53-57 ( 1 992) ( outlining the benefits of "commitment strategy" and different 
methods: staking your reputation, h iring agents required to follow narrow 
procedLE·es, buming bridges, etc. ) .  
1 5 1 .  See generally KEVIN M .  CLERMONT, C IV I L  P ROCEDURE : TERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION AND VENU E  27 ( 1 999) (discussing the law of venue as an example of 
state and federal self-l imitation on authority to adjudicate). 
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on geographic forum selection are the laws of venue and forum non 
conveniens . I 52  
1 .  Applying Options Theory to Res Judicata and 
Collateral Estoppel 
Another example of  this concept is found in the j udicially­
created doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Collateral 
estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prevents the same issues 
from being relitigated in subsequent lawsuits . For the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel to preclude an issue, that issue must be identical, 
actually litigated, decided, and necessary for the court ' s  j udgment in 
a prior lawsuit. l 5 3  The standard first-year law-school civil 
procedure casebook' s  explanation of the reasons behind collateral 
estoppel and res judicata is achieving finality or the repose of  
judgments . l 54 Another traditional rationale for both collateral 
estoppel and res judicata is j udicial economy. 1 55 Finally, decisional 
consistency is  often c ited as an additional benefit of collateral 
estoppel and res judicata. 1 56 But collateral estoppel and res judicata 
both also influence the settlement values of l itigation. Professor 
Bruce L.  Hay argues that collateral estoppel and res j udicata both 
function to better align the settlement values of lawsuits with their 
merits . 1 57 The few economic analyses of collateral estoppel and res 
judicata do not specifically analyze these judicial doctrines as 
expl ic itly proscribing future litigation options . 1 5 8 The perspective of 
1 52 .  !d. at  27-30 .  
1 53 .  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F  JUDGMENTS § 2 7  ( 1 982) .  
1 54 .  See generally BARBARA ALLEN B ABCOCK & TONI M.  MASSARO, C IV IL  
PROCEDURE:  CASES AND P ROBLEMS 1 08 7  (2d ed .  200 1 ) ;  Bmce L .  Hay, Some 
Settlement Effects of Preclusion, 2 1 U. I LL .  L .  REV. 2 1 ,  23 n . 8  ( 1 993  ) ;  ALLAN IDES 
& C HRISTOPHER N .  MAY,  CIV IL  P ROCEDURE :  CASES AND PROBLEMS 1 093  (2003 ) ;  
L INDA SILBERMAN & ALAN R .  STEIN,  C IV IL  PROCEDURE :  THEORY AND PRACTICE 
725 (200 1 ) ;  STEPHEN N .  SUBRIN ET AL. ,  C IV IL  PROCEDURE :  DOCTRINE,  PRACTICE,  
AND CONTEXT 884 (2000 ) ;  STE P H EN C .  YEAZELL,  CIV IL  PROCEDURE 797  ( 5th ed.  
2000) (stating the reasons for procedural rules). 
1 55 .  Hay, supra note 1 54, at 23 n . 1 0  (citing A LLAN D. VESTAL, RES 
JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V- 1 0  to V- 1 1  ( 1 969) ) .  
1 56 .  BONE, supra note 9 ,  at 233 -34. 
1 57 .  Hay, supra note 1 54, at 3 1 -5 1 .  
1 58 .  See Hay, supra note 1 54 (explaining how preclusion rules encourage 
settlement); Note, Exploring the Extortion Gap: An Economic A na�vsis of the 
Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 1 05 HARV.  L .  REV. 1 940 passim ( 1 992)  (comparing 
the effects of three preclusion doctrinal regimes) ; RICHARD A .  POSN ER,  ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 593-95 (6th ed. 2003)  (analyzing i ncentives of the prec lus ion 
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this  A11icle suggests analyzing the preclusion rules of collateral 
estoppel and res judicata specifically from an options perspective, 
which is beyond the scope of this  Article .  
2 .  Applying Options Theory to  the Proposal and 
Ratification of Constitutional Amendments 
The political value of precluding some amendment options 
also helps to explain the supermaj oritarian requirements for the 
proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments . ! 59 The 
United States Constitution requires that at least two-thirds of both 
houses of Congress vote to propose a constitutional amendment. l 60 
Alternatively, two-thirds of the state legislatures must petition 
Congress to call a constitutional convention. l 6 1  The second method 
of proposing a constitutional amendment never has been uti l ized. In 
addition, the United States Constitution requires three-quarters of the 
state legislatures or state conventions to ratify a Constitutional 
amendment. 1 62 The only amendment ratified by state conventions 
was the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition . l 63 
Although over eleven thousand constitutional amendments have 
been introduced in Congress since 1 793 ,  only thirty-three of these 
have received the requisite two-thirds vote of Congress to be 
submitted to the states for ratification . l 64 Of those, six never were 
ratified, including, most notably, the Equal Rights Amendment 
regimes); Stephen J. Spurr, An Economic A nalysis of Collateral Estoppel, 1 1  INT ' L  
REV. L .  & ECON. 4 7  passim ( 1 99 1 )  (analyzing alternative proposed mles of 
collateral estoppel);  Stephen J .  Spurr, Collateral Estoppel, in 1 THE NEW 
PALGRA VE D ICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 289 (Peter Newman ed. ,  
1 998) (defining the preclusion doctrine in tenns of stability and certainty) .  But see 
Bra inerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard 
Doctrine, 9 STAN . L. REV. 2 8 1 ,  285  ( 1 957)  (criticizing "the multiple claimant 
anomaly" that can arise with nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel by util izing a 
hypothetical involving 50  potential plaintiffs injured by a train wreck); Jack 
Ratl iff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Eflect, 67 TEX.  L. REV. 63, 
74, 77-95 ( 1 988)  (discussing the unfairness of the litigation options that plaintiffs 
have under offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel) .  
1 59 .  AVINASH K .  DIXIT & ROBERT S .  PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 25 ( 1 994). 
1 60. U.S CONST. art. V. 
1 6 1 .  ld. 
1 62 .  ld. 
1 63 .  U . S .  CONST . amend. XXI. 
1 64 .  L INDA R. MONK, TI-lE WORDS WE L IVE  BY:  YOUR ANNOTATED GUIDE 
TO THE CONSTITUTION 1 1 6 (2003) .  
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proposed in 1 972 and, most recently, the D .C . Voting Rights 
Amendment proposed in 1 97 8 . 1 65 The consti tutional amendment 
process "guards equally against that extreme facility, which would 
render the Constitution too mutable ;  and that extreme difficulty , 
which might perpetuate its discovered faults . "  1 66 
3 .  Applying Options Theory to Judicial 
Decision-Making 
A similar concern about precluding judicial and legislative 
options helps explain why the current United States Supreme Court 
engages in judicial minimalism. l 67 Deciding a particular case not 
only decides that case on its merits, but it also affects future activity, 
behavior, and cases via precedent and the resulting effects on 
incentives. In addition, the principles of analogical reasoning and 
the demands of logical consistency mean that any judicial decision 
might constrain or preclude future, related judicial or legislative 
options to make decisions about related legal issues. 
book: 
4 .  Applying Options Theory to  Family Law 
Finally, as Professors D ixit and P indyck suggested in their 
Marriage entails significant costs of courtship, and 
divorce has its own monetary and emotional costs .  
Happiness or misery within the marriage can be  only 
imperfectly forecast in advance, and continues to 
fluctuate stochastically even after the event. 
Therefore waiting for a better match has an option 
value. l 68 
This  Article suggests analyzing family law statutes in terms 
of how they regulate the options to marry or divorce.  For example, 
the family law statutes of many states require couples to wait for a 
1 65 .  Id. 
1 66 .  THE FEDERAUST No. 43, at  275 (James Madison) (G.  P .  Putnam's  Sons 
ed . ,  1 888) .  
1 67 .  See, e.g. , CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A T I M E :  JUDIC IAL 
MIN IMALISM ON THE  S UPREME COURT ( 1 999) (discussing examples and 
explanations of j udicial minimalism). 
1 68. DIXIT & P INDYCK, supra note 1 59, at 24. 
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spec ified period of  time after the appl ication for a marriage 
certificate before its issuance . l 69 Symmetrically, some of these 
srates also stipulate that a couple may not divorce until after the 
passage of a mandatory waiting period, which usually exceeds the 
mandatory prenuptial waiting period. l 70 One can understand both 
types of family law statutes as raising the waiting time or non­
monetary price of, if not prec luding, certain maniage or divorce 
options. The debate over whether a state will legally recognize the 
maniage of gay and lesbian couples effectively concerns whether a 
state wi ll preclude legal maniage options and the attendant legal 
rights (themselves options) that follow. In fact, legal rights in 
general are options their owners may choose not to exercise because 
of either low payoffs or high costs of exercising them. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This Article introduces a new options game-theoreti c  model 
of possibly frivolous l itigation. This novel theory is a hybrid 
approach that combines an options approach to litigation incentives 
and game-theoretic models of pretrial settlement negotiations. This 
Article derives a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
credible threatening and fil ing of possibly frivolous litigation based 
on whether the option values from abandoning litigation exceed the 
cost of those litigation abandonment options . Similarly, defendants 
only settle those possibly frivolous lawsuits with initial positive net 
(of the cost of l i tigation) abandonment-option values. This Article 
also considers l imitations of strategic l itigation-options analysis. 
F inally, this Article very briefly introduces other applications of 
options analysis to law by pointing out other l itigation options and 
preclusions of legal options in various legal areas. 
The technical details of this new options game-theoretic 
model of possibly frivolous l itigation are presented in Appendix B of 
this Article . But the intuition of this new model is captured by the 
numerical example presented in the Introduction. The procedural 
1 69 .  See, e.g. , 23 PA. CONS .  STAT. ANN . § l 303 (a) ( West 200 1 )  ("No 
marriage l icense shall be issued prior to the thi rd day following the making of 
appl ication therefor.") .  
1 70 .  See, e.g. , 23 PA.  CONS .  STAT. ANN . § 330 l (d) (West 200 1 )  (stating that 
a married couple must allege that their marriage is inetrievably broken, file 
affidavits that each party consents to a d ivorce, and wait n inety days after 
commencing such action before the court may grant a divorce) .  
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fact that both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 1  (a)( l )( i)  and its state 
counterparts provide a p laintiff with the option to uni laterally and 
voluntarily abandon her lawsuit under certain circumstances without 
prejudice provides plaintiffs l i tigation abandonment options with 
value. If those positive option values exceed a plaintiff s  expected 
l itigation costs, then a plaintiff will credibly threaten to and will file 
a lawsuit. This Article develops a formal mathematical theory of 
how to value a plaintiffs  litigation abandonment options. 
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APPENDIX A :  AN OPTIONS PRIMER 
What do buying a house, having children, and recalling the 
governor of California have in common? These three seemingly 
unrelated experiences all involve not only sequential decision 
making, l 7 1  but also exercising or preserving various options. House 
hunting may involve looking over many houses that differ along 
numerous dimensions . l 72 These differences mean that it can be 
difficuit for a buyer to compare houses in order to determine an 
optimal stopping rule for house shopp ing. l 73 Passing on a particular 
house preserves options to buy other houses, but risks losing an 
option to buy that particular house later. Multiple  potential buyers 
might express interest in a particular house and end up b idding 
against each other. A bidding contest over a house means that a 
potential buyer has fewer negotiating options because she may feel 
she has to make her initial bid her best offer, instead of engaging in a 
series of negotiating rounds. Deciding to bid on, and then possibly 
losing bids on, houses can become an emotional roller coaster. l 74 
The purchase of a home is part of the American dream, but for most 
Americans, their home is their most expensive purchase (at least, 
until then) . Thus, most (at least first-time) home buyers finance part 
of the price of their purchase by taking out a mortgage. Virtually 
every home mortgage grants a homeowner the option to pay off the 
mortgage early without any penalties for prepayment. l 75  
Whether and when to have children, as  well as how many to 
have, are various options that people face.  Before (and even after) a 
child is conceived, there are numerous options regarding birth 
1 7 1 .  See generally ERIC V .  DEN ARDO, DYNAMIC PROGRA M M ING:  MODELS 
AND APPLICATIONS 2-3 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the ubiquitous nature of 
sequential decision making) . 
1 72 .  See generally House Hunters (HGTV television broadcast) (depicting 
the actual house-searching experiences of various first-time home buyers) . 
1 73 .  ROB ERT H .  fRAN K, M ICROECONOMICS AND B EHAVIOR 2 8 8  (5th ed. 
2003) (explaining that experienced realtors often show their c l ients two nearly 
identical houses, one of which is both in better condition and less expensive than 
the other, in order to provide their cl ients with the opportunity to make an easy 
decision) . 
1 74. MARY F RANCES LUCE ET AL . ,  EMOTIONAL DECIS IONS : TR..L\DEOFF 
D I FFICULTY AND COPING IN CONSUMER CHOICE 2-9 (200 1 )  (detailing the 
emotional difficulties that consumers face in deciding among consumption 
a! ternati ves) .  
1 75 .  See 1 5  U . S . C .  § 1 639(c)( l )(A) (2000) (prohibi ting penalties for 
prepayment of principal prior to due date) .  
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control .  Conception can be assisted by reproductive and genetic 
techno1ogies . l 76 Once a child is conceived, many options exist 
regarding prenatal care, whether to carry the child to full tem1, and 
methods of delivery. But, while a woman is pregnant, she does not 
have the option to become pregnant again until after her first 
pregnancy concludes.  In addition, numerous adoption options 
exist. l 77 After a child is born, parents have fewer options in terms of 
alternative joint activities or purchases .  F inally, numerous child­
rearing options exist. Of course,  children have options to have their 
own children. 
California ' s  2003 gubernatorial recall election was authorized 
by the California Constitution provision that provides California 
voters with options to recall their elected officials . l 7 8  Some social 
observers and political commentators feared that California ' s  recall 
election set a dangerous precedent because it could lead to voters 
exercising their options to hold recall e lections of any elected 
officials who make unpopular decisions . l 79 As a result, e lected 
officials may come to engage in perpetual campaigning, and 
elections might degenerate into no more than contests of personality 
or popularity. But, fifteen states ,  the District of Columbia, Guam, 
and the Virgin Islands already have laws that provide their voters 
with options to recall elected state officials, and thirty-six states have 
laws that provide their voters with options to recall various local 
officials . l 80 In fact, a Gallup Poll conducted in 1 987  found that 67% 
of a nationwide sample of 1 009 people supported amending the 
United States Constitution to provide for the recall of members of 
Congress, and 55% of that same sample supported a constitutional 
amendment providing for the recall of the President. l 8 1  Only one-
1 76 .  See, e.g. , Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L .  REV. 639 ( 1 999) (applying economic perspectives to understand the 
ethical ,  legal, and social issues of reprogenetic technologies for trait-enhancement 
selection). 
1 77 .  See, e.g. , El isabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
the Baby Shortage, 7 J .  L EGAL STUD. 323 ( 1 978)  (describing the current adoption 
system and analyzing how the world would look if there were a free market in 
babies). 
1 78 .  CAL.  CONST. art . I I , § §  1 3- 1 8 . 
1 79 .  But see Richard Thompson Ford, Love It: The Recall is Pure 
Democracy, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 1 4 , 2003 , at 
http ://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/6529726 .htm (critic izing poor 
arguments against a recall of California 's  Governor Gray Davis) .  
1 80 .  THOMAS E .  CRONIN ,  D IRECT D E MOCRACY: THE  POLITICS OF 
lN ITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 1 25 ,  1 26-27 tbl .  6 . 1 ( 1 989) .  
1 8 1 .  ld. at 1 32 tb1 . 6 . 2 .  
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third of those polled opposed the idea of recalling nationally elected 
officials . l 82 
Another common feature of buying a house, having children, 
and recalling the governor of California is risk. In fact, virtually 
every decision involves an element of risk. Attorneys, their c lients, 
elected officials, judges, jurors, legislators, l itigants , negotiators , 
regulators, and voters face various risks, including those arising from 
appellate, contractual, electoral, financial, judicial, legislative, 
regulatory, statutory, and technological sources. It is increasingly 
critical for such decision-makers to respond effectively to such risks . 
Just as omnipresent as risks are the methods by which individuals ,  
organizations, and institutions cope or deal with risks, including 
diversifying, hedging, insuring, and learning. In a sense, (payoff­
relevant) inforn1ation can be thought of as the reduction of risk or the 
negative of risk. 
One particular method of handling risks is by utilizing 
options . An option provides its holder with a right, as opposed to an 
obligation, to choose some action in the future . The word option 
"comes from the medieval French and is derived from the Latin 
optio,  optare, meaning to choose, to wish, to desire ." l 83 Options are 
valuable from a decision-theoretic perspective when there are 
unresolved risks because they provide the flexibility not to be  locked 
into an irreversible course of action. In other words, options have no 
value if there is no risk and decisions are reversible . l 84 After all, 
risks involve not only dangers, but also opportunities . l 85 Options 
allow those facing risky environments to profit from the upside 
potential of the risks they face, while tnmcating losses from the 
downside possibility. Options thus offer asymmetric, kinked, or 
non-linear payoffs because options pennit actors to make future 
decisions after learning relevant information concerning the risks 
they face .  
A few legal scholars already have begun to apply options 
analysis to study legal rules and institutions. 1 86 But financial 
1 82 .  /d. at 1 33 .  
1 83 .  B RACH, supra note 72,  at 1 .  
1 84 .  VOLLERT, supra note 1 2 , at 7-8 .  
1 85 .  The Chinese character for crisis i s  composed o f  two ideograms: those 
for "danger" and "opportunity ." 
1 86 .  See. e.g. , Huang, supra note 43, at 1 945 (developing an options-based 
theory of calculating attorney' s  fees) ; Huang, supra note 45 , at 5 7 1 (proposing the 
introduction of the option perspective in teaching corporate law); Mark Klock, Is It 
"The Will of the People " or a Broken A rrow? Collective Preferences, Out-ofthe­
Afoney Options, Bush v. Gore, and A rgurnents for Quashing Post-Balloting 
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economists and management scholars have been studying options 
theory and its applications in the practice of financial engineering 
and management science for over a quarter of a century. l 87 Options 
Litigation A bsent Specific A llegations of Fraud, 57 U. M IAM I L. REV.  1 ,  4 (2002) 
(comparing the 2000 presidential election and financial options); Michael S .  Knoll ,  
Put-Call Parity and the Law, 2 4  CARDOZO L .  REV. 6 1 ,  6 3  (2002) (showing how 
the put-call parity theorem can be uti l ized to evade a wide range of rules) ;  Michael 
S. Knoll ,  Products Liability and Legal Leverage: The Perverse Effects of Stiff 
Penalties, 45 UCLA L .  REV. 99,  1 00 ( 1 997)  (describing cases in which stiffer 
penalties encourage companies to produce and sell risky products) ; Paul G .  
Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 2 4  J .  LEGAL STUD. 1 39 passim 
( 1 995 )  (using options theory to examine the choice between money damages and 
specific performance); Richard A. Nagareda, A utonom_v, Peace, and Put Options in 
the Mass Tort Class Action, 1 1 5 HARV.  L .  REV.  749, 755-58 (2002) (building the 
case for mass tort settlements structured as a trade of punitive damages for put 
options); Klaus M. Schmidt, Contract Renegotiation and Oprions Contracts, in 1 
THE N EW PALG RA VE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 432 ,  432  ( Peter 
Newman ed. ,  1 998)  (describing the important properties of option contracts) ;  
Alexander J .  Triantis  & George G .  Triantis ,  Timing Problems in Contract Breach 
Decisions, 4 1  J. L .  & ECON . 1 63 ,  1 65 ( 1 998)  (providing a model of the private 
incentives for the timing of anticipatory repudiation). 
1 87 .  See generally MARTHA AM RAM, VALUE SWEEP:  MAPP ING CORPORATE 
G ROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 49-64 (2002) (describing how real options can be  used to 
value potential) ;  Martha Amram & Nal in Kulatilaka, Disciplined Decisions: 
A ligning Strategy with the Financial Markets, HARV. Bus. REV . ,  Jan.-Feb. ! 999 ,  at 
95 -96  (describing how to make disciplined decisions, including using options to 
mitigate risks) ; F. Peter B oer, Valuation of Technology U1·ing Real Options, RES.  
TECH.  MGMT. ,  July-Aug. 2000, at 2 7  (describing how real options have been used 
in the valuation of oi l  production) ; B RACH,  supra note 72, at 67- 1 03 (discussing 
managerial options); RICHARD A .  BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINC IPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 268-76 ( 7th ed. 2003) (describing the re lationship between 
the risk associated with an investment and i ts expected retum);  R ICHARD A.  
B REALEY & STEWART C .  MYERS,  CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND VALUATION 429-49 
(2003) (describ ing real options found in investment projects) ;  M ichael J .  B rennan 
& Eduardo S .  Schwartz, Evaluating Natural Resource Investments, 5 8  J. B u s .  1 35 ,  
1 35 ( 1 985)  (applying option theory to  evaluate the soundness of resource 
investments) ;  M ichael J. B rennan & Lenos Trigeorgis,  Real Options: Development 
and Ne11· Contributions, in P ROJECT FLEX IB ILITY, AGENCY, AN D COMPETITION 2-3 
(Michael J .  B rennan & Lenos Trigeorgis eds . ,  2000) (recogn izing that options 
theory in financial markets has been in use since the 1 960s) ;  Andrew H. Chen et 
al . ,  Valuing Flexible Manufacturing Facilities as Options, 38 Q. REV. ECON . & 
F IN .  65 1 ,  65 1 ( 1 998) (applying option pricing methods to evaluating equipment 
such as computer-controlled mac hine tools) ;  Thomas E. Copeland & Phil ip T .  
Keenan, Making Real Options Real, McKrNSEY Q . .  June 1 99 8 ,  a t  1 28 ,  1 29 
(describing the mainstream economic util ity of option valuation) ;  TOM COPELAND 
& VLADIM IR  ANTIKAROV, REAL OPTION S :  A P RACTITIONER' S G U I DE 5 (200 l )  
(explaining the definition of real options) ;  Peter Coy, Exploiting Uncertainty, Bus .  
W K . ,  June 7 ,  1 999,  a t  1 1 8 (describ ing how real options are used in business 
decision-making) ; Avinash Dixit, Investment ond Hysteresis, J. ECON. PERSP . ,  
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Winter 1 992 ,  at I 07, I 08 (observing optimal inertia for dynamic decision-making 
in an uncertain environment); A vi nash Dixit & Robert S .  P indyck, The Options 
Approach to Capital Investment, HARV. Bus.  REv . ,  May-June 1 995 ,  at 1 05 
(discussing use of options in capi ta l  i nvestments); AVINASH K. D IXIT & ROBERT S .  
P INDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY ( 1 994) ( describing the options 
approach as a way to optimize i nvestments) ;  Glenn Hubbard, Investment Under 
Uncertainty: Keeping One 's Options Open, 3 2  1 .  ECON . LITERATURE 1 8 1 6  ( 1 994) 
(analyzing the book INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY by Avinash Dixi t  and 
Robert S .  P indyck, previously referenced in this footnote) ;  Keith J. Lesl ie & Max 
P .  Michaels, The Real Power of Real Options, MCKINSEY Q . ,  June 1 997 ,  at 4, 5-6 
(noting the applicabi lity of opti "Jns to other strategic s ituations); Timothy A.  
Luehrman, Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the 
Numbers, HARV. Bus. REV. ,  July-Aug. 1 998 ,  at 5 1  ("The analogy between 
financial options is . . .  increasingly well accepted."); Timothy A. Luehrman, 
Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options, HAR'/ . Bus.  REV. ,  Sept.-Oct. 1 998 ,  at 90  
(exploring how option pricing can be used to  improve decision-making about 
strategic investments) ;  DAVID G. LUENBEJ:(GER, INVESTMENT SCIENCE 337-43 
( 1 998)  (providing an explanation for evaluating investment opportunities using 
real options) ;  Scott Mason & Robert C .  Merton, The Role of Contingent Claims in 
Corporate Finance, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE F INANCE 34 (Edward 
Altman & Marti G. Subrahmanyam eds . ,  1 985)  (applying an options-evaluation 
framework to the strategic issue of sequencing investment proj ects); Robert 
McDonald & Daniel S iegel, Investment and the Valuation of Firms when There is 
A n  Option to Shut Down, 26  lNT ' L  EcoN . REV. 33 1 ( 1 985)  (noting the effects of a 
shut-down option in  a p lant when future revenues or costs are uncertain) ;  Nancy A.  
Nichols, Scientific Management at !V!erck. An fntervie-vv with CFO Judy Lewent, 
HARV. Bus .  REV . ,  Jan.-Feb. 1 994, at 88 ,  90-9 1 (noting that option analysis  is a 
usefu l  tool for valuing pharmaceutical research investments);  Robeti S .  P indyck, 
irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment, 29 J. EcoN. LiTERATURE 1 1 1 0, 1 1 1 4-
1 5  ( 1 99 1 )  (comparing investment opportunities to a call option stock); REAL 
OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: C LASS ICAL READINGS AND 
RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS passim (Eduardo S .  Schwartz & Lenos Trigeorgis eds . ,  
200 I )  (covering a variety of topics re  Ia ted to  uncertain investments and real 
.options); Alex Triantis & Adam Borison, Real Options: State of the Practice, J. 
APPLI ED CORP. FIN. ,  Summer 200 L at 8 passim (discussing effectiveness of 
options analys is due to its recognition that future decisions to maximize value 
depend on new infonnation); Alexander J. Triantis & James E. Hodder, Valuing 
Flexibility as a Complex Option, 45 J. F IN .  549, 549 ( 1 990) (noting that 
"[c]ontingent claims pricing techniques have been used to value a proj ect 's  . . .  
' real options"") ;  Lenos Trigeorgis ,  Real Options and Interactions with Financial 
Flexibility, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1 993 ,  at 202,  203- 1 6  ( 1 993 )  (providing overview 
of real options literature and presenting principles for quantifying the value of 
various real options) ;  REAL OPTIONS IN  CAPITAL INVESTMENT: MODELS, 
STRATEG IES ,  AND APPLICATION passim (Lenos Trigeorgis  ed. ,  1 995 )  ( integrating 
new contributions to the growing real options l iterature) ;  L ENOS TRIGEORGIS ,  
REAL OPTIONS :  MANAGERIAL FLEXIB I L ITY AND STRATEGY !N R ESOURCE 
ALLOCATION 227-7 1 ( 1 996) (exploring generally the interactions among multiple 
real options); W. Carl Kester, Todav 's Options for Tomorrow 's Growth, HARV. 
Bus. REV. ,  Mar.-Apr. 1 984, at 1 53 ,  1 54 (describing future investment 
opportunities as analogous to ordinary call options on securities). 
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can realize any possible desired pattern of payoffs across 
contingencies and over time. 200 
F inancial options have revolutionized modem financial 
markets by faci litating the reallocation of underlying financial 
market risks. The 1 997  Nobel Prize in Economics recognized the 
path-breaking financial option-pric ing models of Professors Fisher 
B lack, Robert C. Merton, and Myron S. Scholes.20 1 Widely 
publ icized, huge losses from trading in financial options by well­
known corporations such as Barrings Bank, Dell Computer, G ibson 
Greetings, and Procter & Gamble ;202 munic ipalities such as Orange 
County, California;203 and hedge funds such as Long-Term Cap ital 
Management (L TCM)204 i l lustrated the potential dangers from 
200. Stephen A.  Ross, Options and Ef}!ciency, 90 Q.J .  ECON. 75, 84-86 
( 1 976) .  See also Fred Arditti & Kose John. Spanning the State Space vvith 
Options, 1 5  J. F IN .  & QUANTITATIVE ANAL YS!S 1 passim ( 1 980)  (strengthening 
Ross ' s  theorem);  Kose John, Ejjicient Funds in a Financial Market with Options: 
A New Irrelevance Proposition, 3 6  J. F IN .  685 passim ( 1 98 1 )  (extending and 
generalizing Ross ' s  theorem); Rolf W .  B anz & Merton H. Mi ller, Prices for State­
Contingent Claims: Some Estimates and Applications, 5 1  J. Bus .  6 5 3 ,  653  ( 1 978)  
(presenting a method "for making risk  adjustments in practical capital budgeting 
app l ications") ; Douglas T. Breeden & Robert H. Litzenberger, Prices of State­
Contingent Claims Implicit in Option Prices, 5 1  J. Bus.  62 1 ,  622 ( 1 978)  (applying 
Ross's theorem) . See generally Huang, supra note 1 90, at 477 (explaining the 
financial engineering implications of Ross ' s  theorem) .  
20 1 .  See generally Fischer B lack & Myron S .  Scholes, The Pricing of 
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 8 1  J .  POL. ECON . 637 ( 1 973 )  (developing a 
theoretical valuation formula for cal l  options); Robert C .  Merton, Themy of 
Rational Option Pricing, 4 B EL L J. ECON. 1 4 1 ,  1 4 1  ( 1 973)  (discussing "the further 
extension of the theory to the pricing of corporate l iabilities") . See Robert A .  
Janow, In Honor of the Nobel Laureates Robert C. Merton and Myron S. Scholes: 
A Partial Differential Equation That Changed the World, J. ECON . PERSP . ,  Fall  
1 999,  at 229 (exp laining the many contributions and ramifications of  Black­
Merton-Scholes option pricing theory) ; JOHN SUTTON, MARSHALL ' S  TENDENCIES :  
WHAT CAN ECONOMISTS KNOW? 3 5-47 (2000) (explaining how and why option 
pricing models are so successful ) .  
202 .  Brandon Becker & Jennifer Yoon, Derivative Financial Losses, 2 1  J .  
CORP. L .  2 1 5 . 2 1 6- 1 8  ( 1 995)  ( l i sting examples of  financial losses that have been 
described by the press as related to financial derivative instmments) .  
203 . P H ILL IPE  ]ORION,  B IG B ETS GONE BAD: D E RI VATIVES AND 
BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY passim ( 1 995) .  
204. Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of L ong- Term 
Capital Management, J. ECON . PERSP . ,  Spring 1 999, at 1 89 ,  1 97-200;  ROGER 
LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 63 (2000); NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MON EY :  THE  
STORY OF  LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE  LEGENDS B EH I N D  IT  1 97-
230 (2000). 
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speculation in financial options .205 Recently, many commentators 
have questioned whether incentive compensation in the form of 
executive stock options contributed to the series of corporate fraud 
and mismanagement scandals, and whether companies should 
expense their executive stock options _206 
Real options involve decisions concerning activities whose 
risks have not been completely reduced to financial assets or 
financial commodities .207 Real options are so named to differentiate 
them from financial options such as well-known executive stock 
options _208 The phrase "real options" in corporate finance refers to 
the options that managers have to add value to an organization by 
adjusting its production p lans ;209 alter capacity, output levels ,  or 
scale of operations; break up, divide, or partition investment 
opportunities ;  defer before (further) investing; switch inputs, outputs, 
or production methods; and grow from a pilot proj ect.2 1 0  Indeed, 
any dynamic investment opportunity presents a sequence of real 
options_2 1 1 For example, business-deal-making negotiations entai l  
205 .  See Peter H. Huang et a ! . ,  Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two 
Derivatives Debacles in Prime- Time, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 257  (200 1 )  (comparing 
alternative depictions of the dangers of derivatives in two television programs) . 
206. See, e.g. , FRANK PARTNOY, I NFECTIOUS G REED:  HOW D ECEIT AND RISK 
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 1 56-60 (2003 )  (describing how 
compensating CEOs with stock options led to fraud). 
207 .  See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Cotporate Borrowing, 5 J. F IN .  
ECON . 14 7, 1 63 ( 1 977) (coining the phrase "real options") . 
208 .  See Don M .  Chance, A Derivative A lternative as Executive 
Compensation, FIN . ANALYSTS J . ,  Mar.-Apr. 1 997, at 6 (questioning the abi l ity of 
executive stock options, at  least as they are typically granted, to align the interests 
of executives with those of shareholders); RON S .  D EMBO & ANDREW F REEMAN, 
THE RULES OF RISK: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 207-22 ( 1 998) (discussing the 
possibly unexpected and perverse incentive effects of util izing stock options in 
emp loyee compensation). 
209. See Peter Christoffersen & Andrey Pavlov, Company Flexibil ity, the 
Value of Management and Managerial Compensation (Jan. 20, 2003) (unpubl ished 
manuscript, on fi le with author) (presenting a real-options model exp laining the 
staggering variation in managerial compensation in firms of similar sizes across 
industries and countries). 
2 1 0 .  See genera!l_v B RACH, supra note 72, at 67- 1 03 ;  B REALEY & MYERS,  
supra n ote 1 87 ,  at 6 1 6-4 1 ;  D I XIT & P INDYCK, supra note 1 87 ,  at 6-25 ;  
TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1 87 ,  at 1 -4 , 9-20, 1 2 1 -50 .  
2 1 1 .  See, e.g. , Frank T .  Magiera & Robert A. McLean, Strategic Options in 
Capital Budgeting and Program Selection under Fee-For-Service and Managed 
Care, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. ,  Fall  1 996, at 7 (explaining how to apply real 
options analys is to healthcare management). 
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numerous real options.2 1 2  Multinational corporations face numerous 
real options in making foreign investments . 2 1 3  
In describing a generic decision-making setting, the phrase 
"real option" implies that options theory is applicable to analyzing 
the sequential choices that are inherent in such a dynamic and 
uncertain environment. Real options have a fascinating history.2 1 4 
Familiar (and perhaps, some unfamiliar) examples of  real options 
include the options to : abandon, perhaps temporarily (i . e .  mothball) a 
project;2 1 5  become delinquent in property-tax payments;2 1 6  breach a 
contract and pay l iquidated or expectation damages;2 1 7  build or 
develop real-estate property versus delaying construction;2 1 8  
continue with education;2 1 9  declare bankruptcy;220 delay a 
2 1 2 . See generally RICHARD RAZGAITIS ,  D EALMAKING: US ING REAL 
OPTIONS AND MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 1 75 (2003) ( introducing a real-options 
approach to valuing and negotiating business projects). 
2 1 3 . See generally K I RT C. BUTLER, MULTINATIONAL FINANCE 46 1 -87 (3d 
ed .  2004) (providing examples of various real options in cross-border 
investments) .  
2 1 4 .  BRACH,  supra note 72, at  1 3 - 1 5 . 
2 1 5 . See, e.g. , B rennan & Schwartz, supra note 1 87 ,  at 1 47-50 (discussing 
the uti l ity and relative efficiency of temporary or permanent abandonment of a 
project) ; Stewart C .  Myers & Saman Majd, A bandonment Value and Project Lij"e, 
in 4 ADVANCES IN FUTURES AND O PTIONS RESEARCH 1 passim ( 1 990)  (analyzing 
the option to abandon for salvage value). 
2 1 6 . See generally B rendan O 'Flaherty, The Option Value of Tux 
Delinquency: Theory, 28 J .  URBAN ECON. 287 ( I  990) (applying option theory in 
measuring the threat of confiscation of property for fai lure to pay property taxes). 
2 1 7 . See Mahoney, supra note 1 86, at 1 50 (discussing the appl ication of 
options theory to remedies in  lawsuits arising out of breach of contract) .  
2 1 8 . See, e.g. , Paul D. Chi lds et al . ,  Mixed Uses and the Redevelopment 
Option, 24 REAL ESTATE EcoN . 3 1 7 , 3 1 9  ( 1 996) (concluding that options provide 
needed flexibi l i ty i n  detetmining the proper use of land in  redevelopment 
projects); David Geitner, On the Use of the Financial Option Price Model to Value 
and Explain Vacant Urban Land, 1 7  AM.  REAL ESTATE & URBAN ECON . ASSOC.  J .  
1 42 passim ( 1 989) (reviewing the financial option model of under-uti l i zation of 
urban land); Steven R. Grenadier, The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development 
Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets, 5 1  J .  FIN.  1 653  passim ( 1 996) 
(focus ing on the timing of real estate development and how that t iming shapes 
market behavior) ; Sheridan T itman, Urban Land Prices Under Uncertainty, 75 
AM.  ECON . REV .  505 ( 1 985 )  (discussing the pricing of vacant lots and when i t  i s  
rational to  postpone building unt i l  a later date). 
2 1 9 . Uri Dothan & Joseph Wil liams, Education as an Option, 54 J. B us . 1 1 7 
( 1 98 1 )  (explaining a general valuation equation for determining i f  education i s  a 
v iable option and stressing the role of education as an option to postpone 
commitment to a specific  career) . 
Winter 2004] LITIGA TION ABANDONMENT 97 
project;22 1 dissolve a business arrangement, marital or corporate 
union, merger, partnership, or any other form of ongoing or steady 
re lationship ;222 dri l l ,  develop , or start production from oil wells ;223 
engage in venture capital start-up investing;224 exchange one asset 
for another;225 heat new construction with electricity,  heating oi l ,  or 
natural gas ;226 lease airplanes, assets, copiers, power p lants, real 
estate, satell ites, trucks, or zoo animals;227 maintain academic 
employment under faculty tenure;228 make a movie from a script and 
follow-up seque ls  if the original movie is a box office success;229 
220.  Douglas G .  Baird & Edward R .  Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision 
Making, 1 7  J. L .  ECON . & ORG . 3 56 ,  3 5 8-66 (200 1 )  (exploring the decis ion of 
declaring bankruptcy and alternative options that may be avai lable) .  
22 1 .  Jonathan E .  Ingersoll ,  Jr. & Stephen A. Ross,  Waiting to Invest: 
Investment and Uncertainty, 65 J. B us.  1 ( 1 992) ;  Saman Maj d  & Robert S .  
Pindyck, Time to Build, Option Value, and Investment Decisions, 1 8  J .  F I N .  EcoN. 
7 passim ( 1 987)  (using contingent claims analysis to derive optimal deci sion rules 
and to value investments). 
222 .  D ixit, supra note 1 87 ,  at 1 05 (describing how any investment can be 
seen as an option). 
223 . See, e.g. , Jeff Strand, Taxes and Nonrenewable Resources :  The Impact 
on Exploration and Development (July 1 996) (unpubl ished manuscript, available 
at http ://www.ssm.com) (analyzing the effects of tax laws on the last three 
options) .  
224. Pascal Botteron & Jean-Francais Casanova, S tart-ups Defined as  
P011fol ios of Embedded Options, International Center for F inancial Asset 
Management and Engineering Research Paper No. 85 (May 2003)  (unpubl ished 
manuscript, on fi le with author). 
225 .  See generally Wil l iam Margrabe, The Value of an Option to Exchange 
One Asset for A nother, 3 3  J. FIN . 1 77 ( 1 978)  (developing an equation for the value 
of the option to exchange one risky asset for another) . 
226.  B RACH, supra note 72, at 7-8 .  See also Nalin Kulat i laka, The Value of 
Flexibility: The Case for a Dual-Fuel Industrial Steam Boiler, F IN . MGMT.,  
Autumn 1 993 ,  at 27 1  passim (explaining the value of an industrial fac i l ity which 
can be fueled by gas or o i l) .  
227 .  See, e.g. , Steven R .  Grenadier, Valuing Lease Contmcts: A Real­
Options Approach, 3 8  J. F I N .  ECON. 297 ( 1 995) (developing a unified model for 
pricing a variety of leasing contracts using a real-options approach to derive the 
term structure of lease rates); Stephen E. M i l ler, Economics of A utomobile 
Leasing: The Call Option Value, 29 J .  CONSUMER AFFAIRS 1 99 passim ( 1 995)  
(discussing options involved i n  leasing a car) . 
228 .  See generally John G .  McDonald, Faculty Tenure As a Put Option: A n  
Economic Interpretation, 55  Soc. S C I .  Q .  362  ( 1 974). 
229. See generally AMRAM, supra note 1 87 ,  at 1 55-70;  Mm1ha Amram, The 
Value of Film Studios, J. APPLIED CORP F I N . ,  Summer 2003,  at 24 ;  Laura Martin & 
Patrick Wang, F i lm Studio Reel Options (May 1 1 , 200 1 ), Credit Suisse F irst 
Boston Equity Research, available at http ://www.valuesweep.com/ csfb_ 
fi lmoptions5_ 1 1_0 1 .pdf; ZIV BODIE & ROBERT C .  MERTON, F INANCE 448-50 
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purchase assets, items, or properties ;230 threaten to employ fewer 
workers if a firm has a flexible production technology;23 1 throw 
away food obtained from an all-you-care-to-eat buffet or freely 
dispose of items generally; try predatory pricing or to leverage 
monopoly power in one market into monopoly power in another 
market;232  and utilize (export or import) quota licenses .2 3 3  
Real-options theory appl ies financial option-pric ing models 
to derive qualitative, if not (yet) quantitative, estimates of real-option 
values.234 Many quantitative financial and real-option-pricing 
models assume that the underlying risks evolve over time according 
to a particular stochastic process, known as geometric B rownian 
motion with drift. 235  Although there is no reason that such a 
distributional assumption would accurately describe l itigation risks 
in general, other quantitative option-pricing models, such as the 
binomial or two-state option-pricing model, may approximately 
describe a particular lawsuit.236  More generally, qualitative, as 
opposed to quantitative, financial- and real-option valuation models 
apply to litigation-abandonment options because qual itative option­
valuation models make no distributional assumptions regarding the 
stochastic process of underlying risks.237  Nonetheless, qualitative 
(2000). 
230. See, e.g. , John E. Stonier, What is an A ircraji Purchase Option Worth ? 
Quantifying Asset Flexibility Created Through Manufacturer Lead- Time 
Reductions and Product Commonality, in HANDBOOK OF A IRL INE  F INANCE 23 1 
(Gail  F .  Butler & Martin R. Keller eds . ,  1 997) .  
23 1 .  See Nal in Kulatilaka & Stephen Gary Marks, The Strategic Value of 
Flexibility: Reducing the A bility to Compromise, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 5 74 ,  575 
( 1 988) (discussing downsizing in  the context of incomplete contracting and the 
options value of flexibi l ity) .  
232 .  Huang, supra note 46 ,  a t  437 ,  442-43 .  
233 .  James E .  Anderson, Quotas as Options: Optimality and Quota L icense 
Pricing under Uncertainty, 23 J. INT ' L  ECON. 2 1  passim ( 1 987) .  
234. MEGGINSON, supra note 1 89, at 292 n .42 . 
235 .  See, e.g. , J .  M ICHAEL STEELE,  STOCHASTIC CALCULUS AND F INANCIAL 
APPLICATIONS 29-40 (200 1 )  (outl in ing the concept of B rownian motion) ;  LARS 
TYGE NIELSEN, PR IC ING AND H EDGING OF DERIVATIVE SECURITI E S  1 3  ( 1 999) 
(providing examples of both geometric Brownian motion and general ized 
Brownian motion) . 
236 .  James Cox et al . ,  Option Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7 J. F IN .  
ECON . 229 ( 1 979); Richard J .  Rendleman & Brit  J .  Barter, Two-State Option 
Pricing, 34 J. F IN .  1 093 ,  I 093 -98 ( 1 979) (presenting an elemental two-state 
option-pricing model that can be used to solve many complex option-pricing 
problems) .  
237 .  See, e.g. , John C .  Cox & Stephen A. Ross, A Survey of Some Ne>v 
Results in Financial Option Pricing The01y, 3 1  J .  FIN.  3 83 ,  3 84-89 ( 1 976) 
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option-valuation models provide upper and lower bounds for option 
values.238  
(presenting option-pric ing results that are distribution- and preference-free). 
23 8 .  See Merton, supra note 20 1 ,  at 1 42-60 (deriving restrict ions on option­
pricing formulae based upon the assumption that investors p refer more wealth to 
less wealth) ; Hal R. Varian, The A rbitrage Principle in Financial Economics, J. 
ECON . PERSP . ,  Fall 1 987, at 62-64 (deriving bounds for option prices based upon 
the no-arbitrage condition). 
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APPEN DIX B :  A GAME-THEORETIC OPTIONS MODEL OF LITIGATION 
This appendix introduces a game-theoretic options model of 
possibly frivolous l itigation under the assumption that defendants 
and plaintiffs maximize their expected net wealth and initially have 
incomplete but common knowledge regarding al l  information 
concerning their l it igation. This appendix adopts these quite strong 
assumptions to focus attention on the additional and novel insights 
provided by viewing l i tigation from an options-theoretic perspective . 
This Article demonstrates that options analysis generates different 
conclusions and implications from those of expected value analysis 
under an identical set of assumptions. L itigation costs are stochastic 
processes in the game-theoretic options model in thi s  appendix. 
More generally, l i tigants might choose the levels of  l i tigation 
expenditures as endogenous variables as opposed to facing l itigation 
costs that are exogenously distributed random variables . It is  left for 
another day to model endogenous litigation expenditures in a 
strategic options analysis of l i tigation . 
A. Notation 
The fol lowing notation is used in the formal model .  Denote 
the p laintiffs total l itigation costs by P. Denote the defendant ' s  total 
l itigation costs by D. Divide the number of stages in pretrial 
bargaining by the index t = I , . . .  , n . All money values at periods 
t > 1 are denominated in terms of their present discounted values at 
t = 1 (using a common discount rate or factor) . Let It represent the 
plaintiffs l itigation costs at stage t. Thus, by definition ,  P = L1 nft. 
Let Ct represent the defendant's l itigation costs at stage t. Then, by 
definition, D = IInCt- Let Pt denote the plaintiffs  remaining 
litigation costs after stage t. Then, by definition, Pt = Itnlk. Let 
E 1 (Pt) denote the initial expected present value of plaintiffs 
remaining litigation costs once stage t is  reached. Let D t denote the 
defendant's remaining l itigation costs once stage t is reached. Then, 
by definition, Dt = ItnCk. Let E 1 (Dt) denote the initial expected 
present value of defendant's remaining l itigation costs once stage t is  
reached. Let a. denote the relative bargaining strength of the 
plainbff; so that, 0 :::; a. :::; I .  
At stage t, the size of the dol lar amount of judgment expected 
at trial is  Jr. At stage t, the subjective probabi l ity of the p laintiff 
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prevailing at trial is denoted Pt- At stage t, the expected value of the 
judgment expected at trial is defined as Xt = prJr. Denote the initial 
net present discounted expected value of the settlement if the 
l itigation settles at stage t by E 1 (<;t) . Solving recursively via 
backwards induction, E ] (st) = x1 + o.E1 (Dt)-(l-a)EJ (Pt) . Let 
O V1 (<;r) be the initial abandonment-option value of the settlement at 
stage t. Finally, let E 1 (ft) be the initial present-expected value of the 
plaintiff s  litigation cost at stage t .  
The fol lowing game-theoretic options model of lawsuits 
assumes that {Jt} ,  {ft} , and {Ct} are stochastic processes, whose 
distributions are agreed upon and common knowledge among the 
litigants and their attorneys. Recall that the litigants are assumed to 
be risk-neutral, to share a common discount rate, and to face no 
effective wealth constraints . F inally, Jt, It, and Ct are assumed to be 
independent random variab les at each t. 
B. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Credible 
Filing of Litigation 
This characterization of the incentives to file lawsuits 
i l lustrates the power of backwards induction. 
Proposition 1 :  A necessary and sufficient condition for a 
lawsuit to be filed is that the initial value of all the abandonment 
options exceed the initial value of their expected costs or premiums . 
In other words, for all t = 1, . . .  , n ;  these inequalit ies hold at date 1 :  
Proof: (a) Necessity :  If  for any t � n, O VJ (st) < E] (Ir) ; then 
both parties expect at stage 1 that the plaintiff will not continue the 
lawsuit at stage t. Thus, reasoning backwards, both parties expect at 
stage 1 that the p laintiffs threat at stage t to continue the lawsuit is 
not credible .  
(b) Sufficiency : Conversely, if for all t � n,  O V] (st) � EJ (It) ;  
then both parties expect at stage 1 that the plaintiff will at each stage 
t be able to credibly threaten to continue the lawsuit for its 
abandonment option value at that stage. 
It is straightforward to show that any Positive-Expected­
Value (PEV) lawsuit will always satisfy the above condition. 
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Proposition 2 :  If a lawsuit has PEV, then all of the 
abandonment options will have initial values that exceed their initial 
expected cost. 
Proof: A PEV lawsuit by definition satisfies x 1 2': E 1 (P) . 
Because P = L1nlt1 and It 2': 0 for a l l  t, it follows that x 1 2': E 1 (ft) + 
E1 (Pt) for all t. So, a.x1 2': a.E1 (ft) and (l -a.)x1 2': (l -a.)E1 (ft) + (l­
a.)E 1 (Pt) for a l l  t : Adding these last two inequalities together results 
in the inequality, x1 - (l-a.)E1 (Pt) 2': EJ (ft) for all t. This implies that 
x 1 + a.E 1 (Dt)-(1-a.)E 1 (Pt) 2': E 1 (lt) for all t because a.E 1 (Dt) 2': 0. 
But, E 1 (st) = x 1 + a.E 1 (Dt)-(1 -a.)E I (Pt) by definition. So,  for all t; 
E1 (sr) 2': E1 (It) . Finally, by the definition of abandonment-option 
value, we conclude that for all t: O V1 (st) 2': E1 (<Jt) 2': E1 (ft) .  
Thus, a lawsuit having PEV is a sufficient, but no t  necessary 
condition for a lawsuit to be credibly filed by a plaintiff The last 
step in the proof of the above corollary, namely that for all t, O V1 (st) 
2': E J (sr) , is merely an instance of the more general proposition that at 
every date, the abandonment-option value of a random variable is 
greater than its expected value . This is true because the 
abandonment-option value of a random variable can be thought of as 
being equal to its expected value with all of its negative-value 
realizations replaced by zero . 
c. L itigation-A bandonment Option Values and 
Equilibrium Settlement Amounts 
In expected-value l itigation models, the parties compare their 
deterministic cash outflows from the costs of  litigation with their 
probability weighted expected monetary payoffs to litigation. If the 
parties have the same expected values for trial, they will settle rather 
than go to court, in order to save on trial costs (even i f  they are risk­
neutral) or because they are risk-averse (even if trial costs are zero) .  
Parties only go to trial if  they have sufficiently different beliefs about 
the probabi lity that the plaintiff will prevail at trial or about the s ize 
of the judgment if the p laintiff should win at trial. In expected-value 
litigation models, different expected values for the outcome of trial 
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are necessary, but not sufficient for trial .239 Settlement occurs if and 
only if there is a range of mutually acceptable settlement amounts . 
This interval will be non-empty if  and only if the difference between 
the plaintiffs expected gain and the defendant's expected loss from 
going to trial is less than the sum of their litigation costs . The parties 
will settle immediately at an amount in the range of mutually 
acceptable settlement amounts . The precise settlement amount in 
that range is determined by the values of the parties ' relative 
bargaining strengths. A similar immediate settlement result holds 
true in this  game-theoretic options model of lawsuits, the difference 
being the value of the settlement amount. 240 
Proposition 3 :  If the parties to litigation share the same initial 
common probability beliefs {pt} and have common knowledge over 
{lt} ,  {it} ,  and {Ct} , then both parties will agree to settle the litigation 
in period 1 for the Nash equilibrium amount S* = 0 VJ (s 1) ?_ E1 (s 1) .  
Proof: If  the litigants share common prior probabi lity beliefs 
regarding the distributions of the relevant random variables, then 
they also will agree on the values of 0 V 1 (st) and E 1 (it) and the 
inequality conditions in Proposition 1 being satisfied for all t � n .  
Thus, they will agree to settle immediately to avoid incurring 
l itigation costs. In other words, the defendant will effectively agree 
to buy the p laintiffs initial abandonment option for its value 
O V1 (sj) ,  which is at least as large as the net present discounted 
expected value of the lawsuit, E 1 (s 1) . 
In this game-theoretic options model, all lawsuits are settled 
immediately in the case of homogeneous probability beliefs {pt} 
between the plaintiff and defendant and common knowledge 
regarding the distributions of { lt} ,  {It) ,  and {Ct} . As with settlement 
in game-theoretic expected-value models, the settlement amount in 
this game-theoretic options model is constructed iteratively period by 
period from the last period backwards . If  a lawsuit were to be 
credibly filed and not settled immediately due to differing beliefs 
{pt) or lack of common knowledge over the distributions of {lt} ,  
{It) ,  and {Ct) , it might settle nonetheless at some later period, e .g . ,  
239 .  See, e.g. , MICELI ,  supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 57-58 (explaining the differing­
perceptions model) .  
240. See, e.g. , Corne l l, supra note 37, at 1 80-8 1 (giving an example  of the 
options model of a lawsuit). 
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after discovery, due to convergence of probability beliefs {Pt} or 
common knowledge about {Jt} ,  {It} ,  and {Ct} .  In particular, 
optimism or self-serving biases can prevent immediate settlement, as 
is the case in expected-value l itigation models.24 l F inally, notice 
that higher than expected realized litigation costs may cause a 
plaintiff unilaterally to drop her lawsuit, because the actual premium 
of the l itigation-abandonment option at that stage exceeds its value . 
D. Qualitative Comparative Statics or Sensitivity 
Analysis 
A game-theoretic options model of l itigation has different 
implications for how various policies or shifts in the underlying legal 
random variables change the incentives to file l itigation and the size 
of Nash-equilibrium settlement amounts than those that are predicted 
by game-theoretic expected value models of l itigation. Economists 
utilize the phrase "comparative-statics analysis" to refer to a 
comparison of how equilibrium behavior differs for different 
parameter values .242 Another way to think of a comparative-statics 
result is that it analyzes how sensitive behavior endogenously 
detetmined in equilibrium is to changes in exogenous variables .  
Thus, comparative-statics results are forms of sensitivity analysis .  In 
this Article ' s  game-theoretic options model of litigation, many of 
these comparative-statics results are driven by the fact that the option 
value of a random variable increases with its variance because of the 
option to avoid downside risk, while a random variable ' s  expected 
value does not necessarily increase with its variance. 
The first comparative statics  result concerns the awarding of 
punitive damages,243 a practice in certain areas of the law, such as 
24 1 .  See Linda Babcock & G eorge Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining 
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, J. ECON . P ERSP . ,  Winter 1 997, at 1 09 ,  
1 1 1 - 1 6  ( 1 997) (using the example of a Texas tort case) . 
242. See, e.g. , ALPHA C .  C HIANG, FUNDAMENTAL M ETHODS OF 
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1 27-28 (3d ed. 1 984) (explaining the method of 
comparative statics);  LIONEL W. MCKENZIE,  C LASSICAL GENERAL EQUIL IBR IUM 
TH EORY 1 3 3 -64 (2002) (presenting a detailed and rigorous treatment of 
comparative statics) ;  PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 20 (enlarged eel. 1 983 )  (defining comparative statics) .  
243 . See generally A. Mitchel l  Po linsky & Steven Shavcl l ,  Punitive 
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 1 1 1  HARV. L. REV. 869 ( 1 998 )  (providing 
principles of economics to analyze punitive damages question, in l ight of 
deterrence and punishment goals) ;  Cass R.  Sunstein et al., Do People Want 
Optimal Deterrence ?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:  How JURIES DECIDE 1 32 ,  1 32-34 
(Cass R. Sunstein  et al .  ed . ,  2002) (exploring the economic theory of  deterrence 
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treble damages in antitrust,244 punitive multiples in certain tort 
actions,245 or willful contract breach. Punitive damages increase the 
incentive to file lawsuits because such damages increase the amount 
of expected judgments .  But, above and beyond the mean-increasing 
effect on judgments, punitive damages also increase the variance of 
judgments, and hence, they not only increase the net present 
discounted values, but also the option values, of settlement. 
Proposition 4 :  Holding al l other variables fixed, pumt1ve 
damages increase the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium 
settlement amounts more than just a variance-preserving increase in 
judgments by the same factor as the punitive multiple does . 
Proof: All other things being equal, punitive damages 
increase the variance of Xt for all t and thus increase O VJ (sr) for all t. 
Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for filing lawsuits are 
more likely to hold with punitive damages than without punitive 
damages .  In addition, the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
filing lawsuits are more l ikely to hold with punitive damages than 
with merely a variance-preserving increase in judgments by the same 
factor as the punitive multiple .  
The other side of the above result concerns the frequently 
suggested policy of capping the damages that juries can award. 
Although these proposals usually lament both the unpredictability 
and seemingly random nature of jury awards, the argument behind 
these reforms focuses on the absolute magnitude of the punitive 
component of jury awards . A game-theoretic options model of 
t ied to punitive damages). See also John E .  Calfee & Richard Craswell ,  Some 
Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L .  REV.  965, 
994-97 ( 1 984) (discussing damage multipliers as a sl id ing scale,  decreasing as the 
probabi l ity of getting caught goes up) ;  R ichard Craswell ,  Damage Multipliers in 
Market Relationships, 25 J. L EGAL STUD. 463, 478-87 ( 1 996) (explaining the 
shortcomings of damage multipl iers in market relationships, with reference to cost 
increases, risk tolerances, and probabi lity of punishment); Richard Craswell ,  
Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its A lternatives, 97 MICH.  
L .  REV.  2 1 85 ,  2 1 87 ( 1 999) (explaining why the multip lier principle is not 
necessary for optimal deterrence and d iscussing alternatives); Richard Craswel l  & 
John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J .L .  ECON . & ORG. 
279 ,  292-97 ( 1 986) (discussing damage multipliers). 
244. Clayton Act, ch. 323 ,  §4(a), 38 Stat. 730, 73 1 ( 1 9 1 4) .  
245 .  See, e.g. , Milwaukee & St .  Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 9 1  U . S .  489, 492 
( 1 875 )  (holding that punitive damages were "too well-settled now to be shaken, 
that exemplary damages may in certain cases be assessed"). 
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litigation makes clear that not only the size of expected punitive 
damages, but also the variance of punitive damages affects the 
incentives to sue and settle .  This is because, above and beyond the 
mean-decreasing effect on judgments, damage caps also decrease the 
variance of judgments. Hence, they not only decrease the net present 
values but also the option values of settlement. 
Proposition 5 :  Holding all other variables fixed, damage caps 
decrease the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement 
amounts more that just a variance-preserving decrease in judgments 
by the same factor as the damage caps.  
Proof: All other things be ing equal, damage caps decrease the 
variance of Xf for all t and thus decrease O V] (st) for all t. Therefore, 
the necessary and suffic ient conditions for filing lawsuits are less 
likely to hold than with damage caps than without damage caps .  In 
addition, the necessary and suffic ient conditions for filing lawsuits 
are less likely to hold with damage caps than with merely a variance­
preserving decrease in judgments by the same factor as the damage 
caps .  
The above two results concerning effects on  incentives to  file 
lawsuits of substantive or procedural reforms are spec ial cases of the 
next general comparative-statics result about how the abandonment­
option value of a lawsuit changes as the variance of the trial­
judgment award changes .  
Proposition 6 :  Holding all other variables fixed, an increase 
(respectively, decrease) in the variance of the trial judgment award 
increases (respectively, decreases) the incentives to file lawsuits and 
equilibrium settlement amounts . 
Proof: All other things being equal, higher (respectively, 
lower) variance in the trial judgment award increases (respectively, 
decreases) O VJ (st) for all t. Thus, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for filing a lawsuit are more (respectively, less) likely to 
hold with changes in the variance of the trial-judgment award than 
without such changes. 
The next result provides a set of conditions under which the 
English rule for allocating legal costs, under which the party losing 
at trial is required to also pay for the winning party ' s  legal costs, 
increases the incentive to file  lawsuits and equilibrium settlement 
Winter 2004] LITIGA TION ABANDONN!ENT 1 07 
amounts . Professor Cornell observed that even risk-neutral p laintiffs 
are better off under the English n1le for allocating l itigation costs 
than under the American rule for allocating l itigation costs, under 
which each side of l itigation pays for its own legal costs .  This is  due 
to the increased variance of trial outcomes, when taking into account 
paying for legal costs under the English rule for allocating l it igation 
costs as compared to the American rule  for allocating l itigation 
costs.246 But a lawsuit having an expected judgment of x under the 
American rule becomes a lawsuit having an expected judgment of  
x+pP-(1-p)D under the English rule .  Thus, shifting from the 
American rule to the English rule not only increases the variance of, 
but also changes the mean o±� trial outcomes . Hence, whether the 
English mle increases or decreases the l ikelihood of l itigation and 
settlement amounts compared to the American rule  depends 
respectively on whether the English rule's variance-increasing effect 
on the plaintiffs  abandonment-option value outweighs its mean­
decreasing effect on the p laintiff s  abandonment option value or vice 
versa. As the next result makes clear, a sufficient condition for the 
English rule's variance-increasing effect on the p laintiff s  
abandonment-option value to outweigh its mean-decreasing effect on 
the plaintiff s  abandonment-option value is that for all t, PtEt(P) 2: 
(1-pr)Et(D) . 
Proposition 7 :  If  for all t, prEt(P) 2: (1-pr)Et(D), then the 
English rule increases the l ike lihood of fil ing a lawsuit and the 
settlement amount compared to the American rule .247 
Proof: L itigation under the English rule instead of the 
American rule changes both the mean and variance of the l itigation 
process . At each period t, the expected judgment changes from xt to 
xr+ptEt(P)-(1 -pr)Et(D) , where the conditional expected values Et(P) 
and Er(D) are conditional on the realized values of l itigation costs up 
to stage t for the plaintiff and defendant, respectively. By  hypothesis, 
for all t, xt+ptEt(P)-(1 -pr)Et(D) 2: X f. Thus, the English n1le does not 
decrease the expected judgment compared with the American rule .  
The English rule also increases the variance in expected judgment 
compared with the American rule. Each of these effects on the mean 
and variance of j udgment increases O V] (sr) . But the English rule 
246. See Come!! ,  supra note 3 7, at 1 86 (stating that the Engl ish rule would 
increase incentive to sue because of increased variance in the final award) .  
247. If  i t  i s  not true that for all t, p,E,(P) ::::: (l -p1)E,(D) . 
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does not change the plaintiffs l it igation costs at any given stage 
because they are incurred sequentially. Thus, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for fil ing a lawsuit is more l ikely to hold under 
the English rule for allocating litigation costs than under the 
American mle for allocating l i tigation costs. 
The next proposition explains how the option value of a 
lawsuit changes as the variance of the defendant's l i t igation costs 
changes, all other things being equal. More (respectively, less) risk 
over the defendant' s legal costs at any given stage increases 
(respectively, decreases) a plaintiffs  incentive to file a lawsuit 
because of the increased (respectively, decreased) savings m 
defendant ' s  avoided legal costs from settling before that stage. 
Proposition 8 :  Holding all other variables fixed, increasing 
(respectively, decreasing) the variance of defendant's l i ti gation costs 
at any stage k ::; n, increases (respectively, decreases) the incentives 
to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts . 
Proof: Holding all other variables fixed, more (respectively, 
less) variance in the defendant's l itigation costs at stage k S n 
increases (respectively, decreases) O V] (st) for all t S k. Thus,  the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for filing a lawsuit are more 
(respectively, less) l ikely to hold with changes in the variance of the 
defendant' s  litigation costs than without changes in the variance of 
the defendant ' s  l it igation costs . 
Because changing the variance of the plaint iff s  l i t igation 
costs also generally changes the mean of the plaintiff s  l it igation 
costs; changing the variance of the plaintiff s  l it igation costs affects 
both sides of the inequalities from the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the (credible) fil ing of a lawsuit .  To isolate the impact 
of changing the variance of the p laintiff s  l itigation costs upon the 
option value of lawsuit, the next proposition analyzes how the option 
value of a lawsuit changes as the variance of p laintiff s  l it igation 
costs changes in a mean-preserving manner. 
Proposition 9 :  Holding all other variables fixed, a mean­
preserving increase (respectively, decrease) in the variance of 
plaintiffs l it igation costs at any stage k :::; n, increases (respectively, 
decreases) the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement 
amounts. 
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Proof: All other things being equal, higher (respectively, 
lower) variance in the p laintiffs l itigation costs at stage k increases 
(respectively, decreases) O V1 (st) for all t S: k. Thus, the necessary 
and suffic ient condition for filing a lawsuit is more likely to hold 
with mean-preserving changes in the variance of the plaintiffs  
litigation costs than without mean-preserving changes i n  the variance 
of the plaintiffs  litigation costs . 
The next proposition analytically demonstrates how this 
appendix ' s  model of initially NEV lawsuits due to non-negative 
values of litigation-abandonment options generalizes Bebchuk ' s  
model of NEV l itigation. 
Proposition 1 0 : The set of parameter values for which 
initially NEV lawsuits are brought is larger than in Bebchuk ' s  model 
of NEV litigation.248 The difference between the set of parameter 
values for which NEV lawsuits are filed in a game-theoretic options 
model and Bebchuk' s  game-theoretic expected-value model of 
litigation is a function of the difference between O V1 (st) and E 1 ('>t), 
which in tum depends on the abi lity to subdivide the l itigation into 
stages and the opportunities to learn more information. 
Proof: Bebchuk's conditions for the fil ing of a lawsuit can be 
thought of as t, E 1 (st) > ft. Bebchuk ' s  model describes the situation 
of a lawsuit in which the values of all of the variables are known 
with certainty by the litigants . Under symmetric uncertainty, 
Bebchuk's conditions become E 1 (st) > E 1 (lt). Because the lawsuit 
can be dropped t, OV1 (st) :::0: 0 and moreover O V  1 (st) :::0: E 1 (sr) .  Thus, 
whenever E1 (st) > EJ (It) , O VJ (st) > E1 (ft) also holds. But, O V1 (st) 
> E 1 (ft) can hold even though E 1 (It) > E 1 ('>t) . 
Interpreting a comparison between the relative sizes of the set 
of parameter values in Bebchuk ' s  non-stochastic model that satisfy 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the credible filing of NEV 
lawsuits with that of the set of parameter values in this appendix ' s  
stochastic litigation abandonment options model that satisfy the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the credible filing of initially 
NEV lawsuits requires a bit of care . When any non-stochastic model 
is embedded in a stochastic model involving the same variables as in 
the non-stochastic model, the whole parameter space of the non-
248 .  Bebchuk, supra n ote 4 7 ,  at 1 4 . 
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stochastic model is only a s ingle point in the parameter space of  the 
stochastic model .  In other words, for most economically and legally 
relevant choices of topologies and measures,  the entire parameter 
space of the non-stochastic model will only be a small or negligible 
set in the parameter space of  the stochastic mode1.249 Thus, any 
proper subset of the parameter space of the non-stochastic model is a 
fortiori a small and negligible proper subset in the parameter space 
of the stochastic model .  It thus comes as no surprise that a stochastic 
game-theoretic options model of NEV l itigation generalizes 
Bebchuk 's  non-stochastic game-theoretic expected value model of 
NEV litigation because any stochastic model generalizes any non­
stochastic model involving the same variables in the sense that 
stochastic random variables generalize non-stochastic random 
variables. 
The next two results analyze the impact of  changes in a 
plaintiffs  l itigation costs on that plaintiff s  incentive to fi le litigation 
and the resulting equil ibrium settlement amount. Increased or 
greater divisibility of a plaintiff s  legal costs only bolstered the 
credibi lity of a p laintiffs  threats to continue a lawsuit in Bebchuk' s  
nonstochastic mode!250  and Cornel l ' s  non-game-theoretic model .25 1 
A similar proposition holds in this Article ' s  game-theoretic 
stochastic model .  
249. The precise notion of "small" depends on how we measure r i sk .  For 
example, if risk involves a family of normal distributions, the parameter space of 
the stochastic  model is that of the mean and variance of normally distributed 
random variables and the non-stochastic mode! is described by a point, which i s  a 
closed set of measure zero i n  the non-negative quadrant of the Eucl idean p lane . If 
the risk involves a family of smooth distributions restricted to have finite variance, 
then a natural parameter space of the stochastic model i s  the infin ite dimensional 
function space L2 and the non-stochastic model is  described by a set consisting of 
a single point, which is a small or negl igib le set for most economically,  legally, 
and mathematically relevant or appropriate choices of topologies and measures. 
For technical details ,  sec RALPH ABR.A.HAM ET AL . ,  MANI FOLDS :  TENSOR 
ANALYSIS, AND APPL !CATIONS 2, 399, 55 1 ( 1 983)  (defining closed set, Lp spaces, 
and measure zero). 
250 .  Bebchuk, supra note 4 7,  at 1 5  n. l l . See a lso Lucian A .  Bebchuk, On 
Divisibi lity and Credibil ity: The Effects of the D istribution of L i tigation Costs 
Over Time on the Credibil ity of Threats to Sue, John M.  Olin Center in Law, 
Economics, and B usiness Discussion Paper No. 1 90 ,  Harv2rd L aw School (August 
1 996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Review of Litigat ion) .  
25 1 .  Cornell ,  supra note 37,  at 1 84. 
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Proposition 1 1 :  A finer partition of a plaintiff s  legal costs 
can only bolster the credibil ity of that p laintiff s  threats to continue a 
lawsuit and therefore increase equilibrium settlement amounts . 
Proof: Let a finer partition of the plaintiff s  legal costs be 
formed by at  least subdividing some stage k into two substages :  i and 
j. By construction, the plaintiff s  legal costs in stage k can be 
decomposed into two component legal costs in stage i and stage j: Ik 
= li + lj. If the plaintiff initially had credible threats for continuing 
the lawsuit through to trial, then by proposition 1 ,  option values of 
settlement at each stage are larger than the initial expected premia of 
those continuation options . In other words, for all t :::; n; these 
inequalities hold at date 1 :  O VJ (st) 2: EJ (It) .  In particular, at stage 1 
it is expected that at stage k, O VJ (sk) 2: EJ (Ik) = EJ (li) + EJ (lj) . By 
definition of the random variables Sf, sk = S i  = Sj because there i s  no 
intermediate bargaining between stages k and k+ 1 . Thus, O V] (si) = 
O VJ (sk) 2: EJ(Ik) > EJ (li) and 0 VJ (s1) = O VJ (sk) 2: EJ (Ik) > EJ (l_;) . 
By proposition 1 ,  this means that all of the p laintiff s  threats for 
continuing the lawsuit through to trial remain credible .  
If the p laintiff initially did not have a credible threat at  stage 
k for continuing the lawsuit through to trial, then by proposition 1 ,  
O VJ (sk) < EJ (Ik) = EJ (li) + EJ (l_;) . As noted above, Sk = Si = Sj 
because there is  no intermediate bargaining between stages k and 
k+ l .  It is now possible that both O VJ (sk) 2: EJ (Ii) and O V] (sk) 2: 
E 1 (Ij) . Of course, that is not guaranteed because it is also possible 
that O VJ (sk) < EJ (li) yet O VJ (sk) 2: EJ (l_;) , or O VJ (sk) 2: EJ (Ii) yet 
O VJ (sk) < EJ (Ij) , or O VJ (sk) < EJ (Ii) and O VJ (sJJ < EJ (lj) . If any 
one of these three possibilities holds, then the plaintiff is initially 
expected not to have a credible threat at stage i, j, or both for 
continuing the lawsuit through to trial .  
In Cornel l ' s  non-game-theoretic model, front-loading a 
plaintiff s  legal costs, meaning increasing that p laintiff s  expected 
litigation costs at earlier stages while preserving the plaintiff s  total 
expected l itigation costs, reduced that plaintiffs  l i tigation­
abandonment-option value .252 A similar proposition holds in this 
Article ' s  game-theoretic stochastic model .  
252 .  See Blanton, supra note 39, a t  1 6 1 ,  1 86 (explaining that rules enabl ing 
the p laintiff to spread the l itigation over more steps, while maintaining total 
l i ti gation costs at a constant, raises the option value of l it igation). 
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Proposition 1 2 :  Holding all other variables fixed, front­
loading a p laintiffs  litigation costs decreases the incentives to file 
lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts . 
Proof: All other things being fixed, front-loading a p laintiffs  
litigation costs increases E 1 (ft) for initial values of  t = 1 ,  2 ,  . . . .  
Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for initially filing 
lawsuits are less l ikely to hold when a plaintiff s  l itigation  costs are 
front-loaded than when a p laintiff s  litigation costs are not front­
loaded. 
Conversely, back-loading a plaintiff s  legal costs, meaning 
decreasing that p laintiff s  expected litigation costs at earlier stages 
while preserving the plaintiffs  total expected litigation costs , 
increases that plaintiffs  litigation-abandonment-option value. 
Proposition 1 3 :  Holding all other variables fixed, back­
loading a plaintiffs  litigation costs increases the incentives to file 
lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts . 
Proof: All other things being held equal, back -loading a 
plaintiffs  l itigation costs decreases E 1 (It) for initial values of t = 1 ,  
2 ,  . . . . Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for initially 
filing lawsuits are more l ikely to hold when a p laintiff s  lit igation 
costs are back-loaded than when a plaintiffs  litigation costs are not 
back-loaded. 
In Cornell ' s  non-game-theoretic model, increasing a 
plaintiffs  total legal costs reduced that plaintiff s  litigation­
abandonment-option value .253  A similar proposition holds in this 
Article ' s  game-theoretic stochastic model .  
Proposition 1 4 : Holding all other variables fixed, increasing 
a p laintiffs  total expected litigation costs decreases that p laintiffs  
incentives to  fi le  lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amount. 
Proof: All other things being held fixed, increasing a 
plaintiffs  total expected l itigation costs increases E 1 (It) for some 
253 . See B lanton, supra note 39, at 1 6 1 ,  1 86 (citing Cornel l ' s  observation 
that increas ing a plaintiff's initial expenditure to gain infonnation reduces the 
option value of the l i t igation) . 
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value(s) of t. Thus, at least one of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for initially fi ling lawsuits is less likely to hold when a 
p laintiff s  total expected litigation costs increase than when a 
plaintiffs  total expected litigation costs stay constant. 
Conversely, decreasing a p laintiff s  total legal costs increases 
that plaintiff s  litigation-abandonment-option value . 
Proposition 1 5 :  Holding all other variables fixed, decreasing 
a plaintiffs  total expected litigation costs increases that plaintiffs  
incentives t o  file lawsuits and equil ibrium settlement amount. 
Proof: All other things being equal, decreasing a plaintiffs  
total expected l itigation costs decreases E 1 (ft) for some value( s )  of t. 
Thus, at least one of  the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
initially fil ing lawsuits i s  more likely to hold when a plaintiff s  total 
expected l itigation costs decrease than when a plaintiffs  total 
expected l itigation costs do not change . 
